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Islamic Microfinance in Indonesia 
 
Indonesia, the largest Muslim country, has a highly differentiated micro- and rural finance 
sector which has evolved over more than a century. Islamic finance has emerged in 1991, 
comprising Islamic commercial banks and banking units, rural banks, and financial 
cooperatives. In this study we deal with the emerging Islamic microfinance sector in 
Indonesia, particularly rural banks and financial cooperatives: how they have evolved, how 
they compare with conventional institutions, and what their prospects for growth are. 
 
Islamic finance, after 13 years, accounts for a mere 0.74% of total assets of the banking 
sector. However, since Bank Indonesia gave official recognition in 1998 to a dual banking 
system, conventional and Islamic, interest in Islamic meso and macro finance has spread 
among commercial banks, fuelled by low rates of non-performing loans, and the share of 
Islamic commercial banks more than quadrupled during 2001-2003: from 0.17% to 0.74%.  
 
Islamic rural banks (BPRS) are under the same effective prudential regulation and 
supervision as commercial banks and conventional rural banks (BPR). After a promising start 
in the early 1990s, their development has almost come to a standstill. Despite the fact that 
they had only two years less than conventional BPR, they have attained a mere 4% of the 
number and 1.5% of the assets of the rural banking sector. 
 
Islamic financial cooperatives (BMT) suffer from the same regulatory and supervisory 
neglect as the rest of the sector. After a period of rapid growth during most of the 1990s, they 
are now in decline, with perhaps not more than one-fifth in good health. Fresh money 
pumped into the sector without effective regulation and supervision will contribute to their 
downfall, as has been the case in the state-supported cooperative sector. 
 
Options: Islamic microfinance, lacking popular demand and Islamic banking expertise, is not 
off to a promising start in Indonesia. Only commercial banks appear to be able of acquiring 
the art of Islamic banking by training young and dynamic people, but lack experience in 
Islamic microfinance. Islamic, unlike conventional, rural banks, have failed to prove 
themselves as effective and efficient providers of microfinance services; Islamic, like 
conventional, cooperatives are an outright menace to their shareholders and depositors, who 
risk loosing their money. On the basis of 13 years of experience with Islamic finance in 
Indonesia, decision-makers in favor of promoting Islamic financial services are now 
confronted with two major options: 
 
  Focusing fully on Islamic commercial banks in Indonesia and assisting them to establish 
branch networks with Islamic microfinance products. 
  Re-assessing in a participatory process the challenges and realistic opportunities of 
Islamic rural banks and cooperatives, taking into consideration the lack of broad popular 
demand, be it from poor or non-poor, and the lack of dynamic growth. 
 
Opportunities: We recommend to decision-makers in Islamic organizations, government 
agencies and donor organizations to cautiously examine the following opportunities for the 
development of a healthy Islamic financial sector in Indonesia: 
 
(1) Islamic commercial banks, in setting up branch networks of Islamic MFIs, may learn, 
with good prospects, from the rich experience of successful microfinance strategies and 
institutions within Indonesia, particularly the BRI Microbanking Division, one of the most 
successful microfinance programs in the developing world.  
 
(2) Islamic rural banks need to be revamped if they are to play a more than marginal role in 
Indonesia. This will require an overall development plan for the BPRS sector mutually 
agreed upon by all stakeholders and a strong banking association to provide a full range 
  iiof support services to their members. Some of the more successful Islamic rural banks 
may serve as exposure training sites to future managers. Auditing should be mandatory 
regardless of size. 
 
(3) Islamic cooperatives suffer from much the same set of problems as the whole 
cooperative sector. There is little chance for any intervention to be successful in the short 
run. They need a system of prudential regulation, mandatory auditing, and effective 
supervision by an appropriate financial authority. They should be fully financed through 
equity and savings deposits of members; only healthy and well-supervised cooperatives 
should be permitted to collect deposits from non-members. They need strong 
associations and federations to provide a full range of support services to their members.  
 
A note on Islamic finance in the province of Aceh after the Tsunami:
2 
Of all areas devastated by the Tsunami, the province of Aceh has been hardest hit. Providing 
relief and reconstructing the livelihoods of the surviving victims is the immediate task; 
reconstructing the physical and institutional infrastructure will have to come next. If the efforts 
at reconstruction are to lead to sustainable development, rural and microfinance will have an 
important role to play. For political reasons, Aceh has been isolated in the past from 
mainstream development. The challenge is thus not just reconstructing, but laying the 
foundations for a sound system of rural and microfinance institutions. All those impoverished 
by the floods, as well as everybody else, need access to sustainable financial institutions for 
depositing savings including relief benefits and obtaining credit. As I have shown elsewhere 
(Seibel 2003a), relief benefits are likely to be wasted, or limited in their effectiveness, if 
victims have no access to financial services. The people of Aceh adhere strongly to the 
principles of Islam, including those of Islamic finance. Despite its isolation, Aceh already has 
5 Islamic rural banks and 76 Islamic cooperatives, of which less than 20 are functioning. This 
is a beginning, but not an adequate structure of Islamic finance. Building strong Islamic 
financial institutions in Aceh could be of enormous benefit to the reconstruction and 
development of the province. Thereby Aceh could become the province benefiting most from 




                                                 
2 This note was prepared in January 2005. Since mid-2005 GTZ has been supporting the 
Reconstruction and Development of the Microfinance System in Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam (NAD), 
Indonesia. 





Table of contents 
 
iv
USD/IDR Exchange Rates, 1992-2004 







1.  Financial sector framework 
  1.1 Financial infrastructure 




2.  Principles and products of Islamic finance 
 
5
3.   Evolution and structure of Islamic finance in Indonesia 
  3.1 Typology of Islamic financial institutions in Indonesia 
  3.2 Institutional and regulatory framework: mainstreaming Islamic banking 
  3.3 Origins and development of Islamic commercial and rural banks 
  3.4 Conventional and Islamic commercial banking: a comparison 






4.  Islamic rural banks (BPRS) 
  4.1 Conventional and Islamic rural banks (BPR and BPRS): a comparison 
  4.2 Regional distribution 
  4.3 Mission, ownership and governance 
  4.4 Delivery system 
  4.5 Market and outreach 
  4.6 Total assets and sources of funds 
  4.7 Financial services 
  4.8 Economic performance 
  4.9 Affiliations and support 












5.  Islamic cooperatives (BMT. BTM) 
  5.1 Conventional and Islamic cooperatives: a comparison 
  5.2 Sample BMT: origin and history 
  5.3 Regional distribution 
  5.4 Mission, legal status and governance 
  5.5 Delivery system, market and outreach 
  5.6 Total assets and sources of funds 
 5.7Financial  services 
  5.8 Economic performance 










6.  Summary, assessment and recommendations 
  6.1 Summary and assessment 











  ivAnnexes : 
  
1: Consolidated balance sheet & income statement of Islamic rural banks, 2003 





1: Financial infrastructure 
2: Development of conventional and Islamic rural banks in Indonesia, 1993-2003 
3: Evolution and structure of Islamic finance in Indonesia 
4: Islamic rural banks (BPRS) 








  v 
 
Indonesia macroeconomic data, 2001-2003 
 
  2001  2002  2003 
GDP growth rate  3.5  3.7  4.1 
Population  (million)  208.9 212.0 215.2 
 Percent  poor      17.4 
GDP per capita in US $  685  815  969 
Inflation rate (CPI) in %  12.6  10.0  5.1 
Exchange rate to the US$: average  10,255  9,318  8,572 
Exchange rate (median) to the US$: end of year  10,446  8,938  8,451 
Financial deepening (M2/GDP) in %  57.5  54.9  53.5 
Average bank lending rate in % (Working capital credit only):   19.19  18.25  15.07 
Average bank deposit rate (one-month fixed deposits) in %  16.07  12.81  6.62 




USD/IDR Exchange Rates, 1992-2004 
 
  Year End  Year average 
1992 2,067  2,033 
1993 2,102  2,089 
1994 2,199  2,163 
1995 2,287  2,247 
1996 2,344  2,329 
1997 3,646  2,776 
1998 8,000  10,248 
1999 7,100  7,787 
2000 9,675  8,527 
2001 10,400  10,271 
2002 8,940  9,318 
2003 8,451  8,572 






Note on transcriptions: 
Key Islamic banking terms are based on Islamic law written in Arabic. 
Transcriptions vary widely in Indonesia and elsewhere; there is no 
authoritative standard of transcription. In chapter 2.3, the key terminology is 
therefore presented in Arabic, the most common international transcription, 
and widely used transcriptions as used in Indonesia. An example are the 
various transcriptions of the term for Islamic law:  ﺔﻌﻳﺮﺷ , shar'iah, Syariah, 
sharia. The Arabic terms and international transcriptions have been 
provided by Dr. Omar Imady, Damascus. 
 
 




Islamic banking based on Islamic law, sharia, started just about 40 years ago. Few countries 
have adopted Islamic banking as its sole mode of operation, among them Iran and Sudan. 
Other predominantly Islamic countries have adamantly stayed away from Islamic banking; 
yet some have tolerated niches of Islamic microfinance as a concession to local culture, like 
Syria for example
3. In recent years, an increasing number of countries in both the developed 
and the developing world have seen the emergence of Islamic banks, banking units and 
Islamic products. However, this growth has not been mirrored in the microfinance sectors of 
most countries with Islamic financial services. This is probably due to Islamic banking 
principles like partnership and profit-sharing with investors, which require adequate book-
keeping and auditing, or, as an alternative, charitable credit to the poor without profit-sharing. 
As a result, the vast majority of the poor have remained without access to finance in these 
countries.  
 
In Indonesia, the largest Muslim country, Islamic finance has evolved since 1991, comprising 
Islamic commercial banks, commercial banking units, rural banks, and financial cooperatives. 
Indonesia also has one of the most differentiated micro- and rural finance sectors among 
developing countries, comprising both formal and non-formal financial institutions. In this 
study we deal with the emerging Islamic microfinance sector in Indonesia, particularly rural 
banks and financial cooperatives: how they have evolved, how they compare with 
conventional microfinance institutions, and what their prospects for growth are. The objective 
of this study is contribute to international awareness of Islamic microfinance by providing an 
overview of the characteristics and current practices of sharia institutions involved in 
providing financial services to poorer segments of the Indonesian population.  
 
Field work in Indonesia, limited to western Java due to time constraints, was carried out 
between 24 May and 5 June 2004. Main sources of information were the Islamic banking 
directorate of Bank Indonesia, the Islamic banking association ASBISINDO, the agency for 
the promotion of Islamic cooperatives PINBUK, the Ministry of Cooperatives and Small 
Enterprises, and case studies of five Islamic rural banks (BPRS) and four Islamic savings 
and credit cooperatives (BMT). It should be noted here that there is no reliable statistical 
information on Islamic cooperatives, quite in contrast to Islamic commercial and rural banks, 
which are supervised by the central bank. Other sources of information are listed in the 
references and in Annex 1. Logistical support was efficiently provided by the GTZ project 
Promotion of Small Financial Institutions (ProFI). We gratefully acknowledge these invaluable 
inputs and services.  
 
The study has greatly benefited from the collaboration of Wahyu Dwi Agung, one of the early 
promoters of Islamic banking in Indonesia and head of ASBISINDO, who has freely provided 
his insights and contacts.  
 
                                                 
3 Cf. Imady & Seibel, 2003 
  11.  Financial sector framework  
 
1.1 Financial  infrastructure  
 
Indonesia has one of the most differentiated banking and microfinance sectors of any 
developing country. After the establishment of the first rural bank in 1895, a three-tiered 
financial system of national, district and village institutions evolved. At the top has been a 
century-old agricultural bank, now known as Bank Rakyat Indonesia (BRI). At the community 
level were two types of village banks, specialized on banking-in-kind and banking-in-money. 
As early as 1910, there were over 13,000 rural banks, comprising 12,542 rice banks and 585 
money banks. Since then, money has gradually replaced kind. After more than a hundred 
years of evolutionary growth, the banking sector now comprises 138 commercial banks with 
a total of 7,730 bank offices (excluding the BRI units); and 2,134 rural banks (BPR). The rural 
and microfinance sector comprises 53,500 units, including 6,300 formal and 47,200 
semiformal microfinance units (see App. 1 Table 1). Most notable among them are some 
4000 BRI Units (formerly unit desa), presumably the developing world’s most successful rural 
microfinance providers. They account for 74% of microsavings and 39% of microloans. In 
addition, there are some 800,000 channeling groups and uncounted numbers of rotating 
savings and credit associations (arisan) of indigenous origin. In recent years new efforts 
have been made to extend the protection of the law to financial institutions of the poor and 
near-poor by preparing a draft law for MFIs (Lembaga Keuangan Mikro, LKM).
4 Despite the 
extraordinarily high level of institutional differentiation, large numbers of households 
reportedly are without access to formal or semiformal finance.  
 
The banking law in Indonesia recognizes two types of banks: commercial banks (Bank 
Umum, BU, lit.: universal banks) and rural banks (Bank Perkreditan Rakyat, BPR, lit.: 
people’s credit banks). The commercial banking sector, which nearly collapsed during the 
1997/98 crisis, has recovered due to major consolidation efforts of the government, which 
included numerous bank closures and mergers. From 1999 to 2003, the gross non-
performing loan ratio (NPL) went down from 32.8% to 8.1% and net NPL from 7.3% to 1.8%. 
During the same period, the banks went from losses of 7.5% to (pre-tax) profits of 2.1% of 
total assets; the capital adequacy ratio (CAR) went from –8.1% in 1999 to 20.7% in 2003. 
However, overall growth of the commercial banking sector is still sluggish.  
 
Rural banks (BPR), which are one of the  two types of microfinance institutions dealt with in 
this study, are based on the law of 1988 (PAKTO27). They consist of newly established BPR 
(BPR baru) and pre-existing rural banks converted into BPR (BPR lama). In the context of 
financial liberalization, the law was enacted in an effort to rationalize the highly complex rural 
finance sector, with the objective of bringing existing institutions under the umbrella of 
prudential regulation and supervision, providing a framework for the establishment of new 
financial institutions with private capital, and extending the outreach of financial institutions to 
the poorer sections of the rural and peri-urban population, thereby lessening their 
dependence on private moneylenders. Minimum capital requirements for BPR were uniformly 
set at Rp 50m, equivalent to US$ 29,000 in 1988 ($21,000 in 1996 as a result of 
devaluation). Most of the newly established BPR were set up by private owners. 
 
There are now (Dec.2003) 2134 licensed and regulated BPR. While they account for a mere 
1.0% of total banking assets, their asset growth during the last three years has exceeded 
that the commercial banking sector by a wide margin (see App. 1 Table 2). During their 
lifetime of fifteen years, BPR expanded at widely differing rates in three phases:  
Phase 1: During the initial five-year period, 1989-93, BPR grew at an average number 
of 342 BPR per year.  
                                                 
4 Act XXX of 2001, draft dated 14/9/2001. This is a participatory effort coordinated by a Tim Inisiatif, 
first headed by Bank Indonesia and now by a newly created microfinance unit in the MoA. World Bank, 
ADB and GTZ are involved.  
  2Phase 2: During the following six years, 1994-99, growth slowed to 120 BPR per year.
 5 
As a surprise to many, the Asian Financial Crisis not only failed to impede further 
growth; if anything, it inspired further growth: with 153 additional BPR established in 
1997, 122 in 1998 and 165 in 1999 (averaging 147 per year during the three main crisis 
years). As observers noted, “the BPR have come through the financial crisis in very 
good shape and are now reaching larger numbers of customers in a sustainable 
manner” (ADB 2003 Suppl. App. C: 6-7). 
Phase 3: The year 2000 marked a turn-around, initiating a consolidation period. Due to 
increased minimum capital requirements, more rigid supervision by the central bank, 
the enforcement of performance standards and the closing of non-performing BPR, 
their number declined. During the four-year period 2000-03, the average annual 
decrease in the number of BPR was 73. Until 2003, BI had revoked the licenses of 193 
BPR. Evidently, BI not only regulates but also effectively supervises the BPR, 
enhancing prudential banking and revoking licenses if banks do not comply. 
 
There are still large numbers of rural banks expected to comply with registration 
requirements and obtain a BPR license, but unable to come up with the required capital. 92 
applications for new BPR are reportedly in the pipeline. 
 
The shrinking numbers of BPR during the last three years present a dismal picture. Yet, 
while numbers shrank, assets grew rapidly, indicating an impressive performance during this 
period of consolidation, reaching total assets of Rp 12.90tr, or on average Rp 6.05bn or US$ 
715,300 per BPR as of Dec. 2003. During the three-year period from December 2000 to 
December 2003, their total assets grew by 173%, deposits by 189%, and credit by 154% – 
compared to growth rates of 11%, 25% and 49%, respectively, of the commercial banking 
sector.
6 Given an average annual inflation rate of 9.3% during that period, the growth rates of 
commercial banks were negative, while those of the BPR were strongly positive. In 2000, 
2001 and 2002, BPR pre-tax profits stood at 2.5%, 3.3% and 3.6%, respectively, of total 
assets.  
 
Excess liquidity has been a major problem of the commercial banking sector in Indonesia. 
As of November 2003, banks mobilized Rp 875.4tr (US$103bn) in deposits, but lent only Rp 
475.7tr ($56bn), generating Rp 400tr ($47bn) in excess liquidity. Indonesia’s problem is how 
to lend, not lack of funds. The loan-to-deposit ratio (LDR) has been improving in recent 
years: from 26.2% in 1999 to 43.7% in 2003, but is still low. This problem also applies to the 
major rural and peri-urban microfinance provider, the BRI Microbanking Division. Since 1990, 
                                                 
5 The picture is complex, depending on whether we look at total numbers of BPR, numbers by origin, 
and total assets. There are three major origins of BPR: newly established institutions, converted 
conventional BPR, and converted other microfinance institutions. Unfortunately, the reported figures 
by origin do not conform to the overall figures on BPR reported above (see Table __). The following 
information on newly established and converted BPR is therefore only indicative.  In 1990, 329 BPR 
had been newly established (56%), and 257 existing institutions (44%) had acquired a BPR license, 
bringing the total to 586 BPR. By 1992, the total number was 1,021: the number of new BPR had 
surged to 848 (83%) , while the number of converted BPR had declined to 173 (17%), indicating that a 
good number of them was not able to live up to Bank Indonesia standards.  During the eight-year 
period until the end of 1996, the total number of BPR had reached almost 2,000: 1,343 new BPR 
(68%) and 644 converted BPR
5 (32%), totaling 1,987. The financial crisis brought the growth of the 
number of new BPR almost to a standstill; their total number continued to grow, but mainly through the 
conversion of existing LDKP, previously under provincial law, into BPR under national banking law. By 
June 2002, the total number of BPR had grown to 2,213: 1,365 new BPR (62%) and 848 converted 
BPR (38%) [151 Bank Pasar/Bank Desa, 133 BKPD and 564 LDKP]. BI has played a decisive role in 
closing poorly performing BPR and in assisting various MFIs to transform into BPR. By Dec. 2003, the 
total number of BPR had declined to 2134. (ADB Suppl. App. C: 6-7; Steinwand 2001: 172) 
6 Inflation rates stood at 12.6% in 2001, 10.0% in 2002 and 5.1% in 2003, averaging 9.3% p.a. This 
means that real growth rates of total assets and deposits of the commercial banking sector were 
negative during that time period, while all three growth rates of the rural banking sector were highly 
positive in real terms.  
  3the BRI units have produced large amounts of excess liquidity from rural savings, 
consistently exceeding $1bn per year throughout and after the Asian Financial Crisis; as of 
December 2003, its LDR was 47.6%, close to the commercial banking average. There is thus 
little, if any, justification for donors to pour hard-currency liquidity into the national soft-
currency intermediation circuit. 
 
Smaller financial institutions have had the opposite problem: a shortage of liquidity. Rural 
banks (BPR), the largest entities among the small financial institutions, with consolidated 
deposits of Rp 8.89tr and loans outstanding of Rp 9.12tr, had a slight liquidity shortage of Rp 
0.23tr and an LDR of 103% as of Dec. 2003. Among the yet smaller non-bank financial 
institutions, with drastically lower average loan sizes, the 4,482 BKD and 1,428 LDKP, with 
total deposits of Rp 242bn and total loans outstanding of Rp 521bn, had a severe liquidity 
shortage of Rp 279 bn and an LDR of 215%. Similarly, the 40,527 financial cooperatives, 
with total consolidated deposits of Rp 1.66tr and loans outstanding of Rp 4.79tr, have a 
liquidity gap of Rp. 3.13tr and an LDR of 189%. The latter figures conceal major differences 
between the various types of cooperatives: the private credit unions and the Islamic 
cooperatives are quite balanced, with LDRs of 109% and 111%, respectively; while the 
government-pampered USP and KSP have ratios of 314% and 469%, respectively. (Data 
~2000, see App.1 Table 1) 
 
Two major issues and challenges in microfinance have remained:  
  how to use the existing massive excess liquidity in the banking sector to extend 
financial services to those segments of the rural population without access; 
  whether, and how, to extend recognition, depositor protection, regulation and 
(delegated) supervision to large numbers of small financial institutions.  
These issues apply to both conventional and Islamic financial institutions in Indonesia. 
 
1.2  Macroeconomic and policy framework  
 
There is a considerable correspondence between today’s policy concerns and those at the 
beginning of the 20
th century: an emphasis on demand-oriented financial services, 
institutional viability, sustainability of the system as a whole, as well as experimentation to 
expand services to the poor with individual and group technologies.
7 Following the oil price 
increase of 1973 and again in 1979, Indonesia invested substantial amounts in development, 
using directed credit as one of its tools. The decline in oil prices since 1982 initiated an era of 
liberalization, shifting the prime mover of development from government to market forces. 
Inflation fell from 20% during 1973/74 to 5.7% during 1985/86: an important prerequisite for 
financial market liberalization. In microfinance, the policy environment evolved rapidly during 
the 1980s and 1990s, highlighted by:  
 
(a) full interest rate deregulation and elimination of credit ceilings in 1983 (preceded by 
the oil crisis of 1982), which gave birth to the reform of the BRI unit system in 1984  
(b) institutional liberalization in 1988 (preceded by the oil crisis of 1986), which led to the 
rise of rural banks (BPR) as part of the formal financial sector  
(c) the phasing out of 32 out of 36 subsidized credit programs in 1990 
(d) a new banking law in 1992, acknowledging two types of banks: commercial banks 
and rural banks 
(e) 1997-2002: financial sector crisis management geared to prudential regulation and 
effective supervision. 
                                                 
7 „Interest rates had been set high enough not only to cover costs but to increase the institutions’ 
equity base through retained earnings (BKD). Subsidies were limited to initial start-up support after 
which the institutions had to become viable. Maturities and repayment schedules of the loan products 
were designed according to the needs of the customers. Unsecured, ‘character-based’ lending was 
common… Innovative techniques like group-lending and joint liability were developed and tested (and 
given up again). Strict loan enforcement was common…” (D. Steinwand, The Alchemy of 
Microfinance. Berlin 2001: 103) 
  4 
These policies proved tremendously successful: during 1979-96 GDP grew at 7% p.a.; the 
percentage of poor fell from 60% in 1970 to 11.5% in 1996.
8 The process of steady growth 
was unexpectedly interrupted by the Asian financial crisis, krismon, which revealed (i) the 
dangers of financial deregulation without effective supervision (meaning: enforcement of 
prudential regulation) and (ii) the risks of excessive short-term external borrowings. At the 
same time, it revealed the fragility of poverty alleviation, leading to a doubling of the number 
of poor, mostly from the realms of the near-poor, to around 20% of the population by 1999.
9 
Since 2000, there have been clear signs of recovery. From 2001 to 2003 GDP grew at rates 




2.  Principles and products of Islamic finance  
 
The principles of Islamic finance are laid down in Islamic law, the sharia, ﺔﻌﻳﺮﺷ. 
Islamic finance, comprising financial transactions in banks and non-bank financial 
institutions formal and non-formal financial institutions, is based on the concept of a social 
order of brotherhood and solidarity. The participants in banking transactions are considered 
business partners who jointly bear the risks and profits. Islamic financial instruments and 
products are equity-oriented and based on various forms of profit and loss sharing. As 
Islamic banks and their clients are partners, both sides of financial intermediation are based 
on sharing risks and gains: the transfer of funds from clients to the bank (depositing) is based 
on revenue-sharing and usually calculated ex post on a monthly basis
11; the transfer of funds 
from the bank to the clients is based on profit-sharing (lending, financing), either at a 
mutually agreed-upon ratio as in the case of mudarabah or at a mutually agreed-upon fixed 
rate. Such ratios and rates vary between institutions and may also vary between contracts 
within the same institution, contingent upon perceived business prospects and risks. Islamic 
banking finances only real transactions with underlying assets; speculative investments such 
as margin trading and derivatives transactions are excluded. Lending, or financing, is backed 
by collateral; collateral-free lending would normally be considered as containing a 
speculative element, or moral hazard. Similarly, to avoid speculation and moral hazard, 
normally only investors with several years of successfully business experience are financed. 
The paying or taking of riba, interest, is prohibited. The same principle of partnership is 
applied to Islamic insurance. It is based on a collective sharing of risk by a group of 
individuals whose payments are akin to premiums invested by the Islamic banking institution 
in a mudarabah arrangement for the benefit of the group. 
 
The fundamental principle of solidarity at the societal level finds its expression in a special 
category of financial products without remuneration, qard. Investors without adequate 
business experience who are considered high-risk may receive a moderate amount of 
financing on qard hasan terms, free of any profit-sharing margin, but usually repaid by 
instalments and backed by collateral. Similarly (but rarely in Indonesia), depositors may save 
in an Islamic financial institution without receiving a remuneration, usually with the 
expectation that the funds are used for social or religious purposes. In inflationary 
economies, qard deposits and financings pose unresolved problems. A typology of Islamic 
financial products is presented below. 
                                                 
8 The World Bank, Indonesia Country Assistance Note, March 29, 1999. 
9 Official figures for 1999 vary from 18.2% (Susenas, Central Bureau of Statistics) to 27.1% (Smeru). 
10 Also, Interest rates declined: average bank lending rates for working capital credit fell from 19.2% to 
15.1%, one-month fixed deposit rates from 16.1% to 6.6% and one-month treasury bills (SBI) from 
17.6% to 8.3%. 
11 In one sense, depositors are treated like shareholders; in another sense, they are treated better 
than shareholders, as they share in the revenue and not the profit or loss. 
  5 
Table 3.1:  Typology of Islamic financial products 
(1) Financing  products 




Equity participation, investment and management from all 
partners; profits are shared according to a pre-agreed ratio, 
losses according to equity contributions. 
Mudarabah 
ﺔﺑرﺎﻀﻣ 
A profit-sharing partnership to which one contributes the capital 
and the other the entrepreneurship; or the bank provides the 
capital, the customer manages the project. Profit is shared 




Charitable loans free of interest and profit-sharing margins, 








An agreement by the bank to undertake some of the liabilities of 
the customer for which the bank receives a fee. When the 
liabilities mature the customer pays back the bank 
Advance purchase financing products: 
Murabahah 
ﺔﺤﺑاﺮﻣ 
A sales contract between a bank and its customers, mostly for 
trade financing. The bank purchases goods ordered by the 
customer; the customer pays the original price plus a profit 
margin agreed upon by the two parties. Repayment by 
installments within a specified period 
Istithna’ 
ءﺎﻨﺜﺘﺱإ 
A sales contract between bank and customer where the 
customer specifies goods to be made or shipped, which the 
bank then sells to the customer according to a pre-agreed 
arrangement. Prices and instalment schedules are mutually 
agreed upon in advance. 
Mu’ajjal 
Bai al Salam 
ﻞﺟﺆﻣ ﻊﻴﺑ 
Purchase with deferred delivery: A sales contract where the 
price is paid in advance by the bank and the goods are delivered 
later by the customer to a designee  
Ajaar 
Ijarah  
Ijarah Mutahia Bittamlik 
ﺎﺟﺁ 
Lease and Hire Purchase: A contract under which the bank 
leases equipment to a customer for a rental fee; at the end of 
the lease period the customer will buy the equipment at an 
agreed price minus the rental fees already paid. 
 
(2)  Deposit products  
Wadi’ah 
ﺔﻌیدو 
Sight deposits, including current accounts (giro wadi’ah) 
Mudarabah 
ﺔﺑرﺎﻀﻣ 
Deposit products based on revenue-sharing between depositor 
and bank, including savings products withdrawable at any time 
and time deposit products 
Qard al-Hasanah 
ﻦﺴﺣ 
Unremunerated deposit products, usually for charitable 
purposes (widespread in Iran, but not found in Indonesia) 
 
(3) Insurance  products 
Tadamun, Takaful 
 ﻦﻤﻠﻀﺗ - ﻞﻓﺎﻜﺗ   
Islamic insurance with joint risk-sharing 
 
  63.   Evolution and structure of Islamic finance in Indonesia 
 
3.1  Typology of Islamic financial institutions in Indonesia 
 
Islamic finance is defined as a financial system based on Islamic law,  ﺔﻌﻳﺮﺷ, variously 
transcribed as shar'iah, sharia or Syariah. In Indonesia, Islamic finance is referred to as 
sharia finance when addressed to a wider audience (as in central bank publications) or 
Syariah finance when addressed to a predominantly Islamic audience. In this study, both 
terms are used. Islamic finance in Indonesia comprises two types of institutions:  
 
  banking institutions, which fall under the banking law, and  
  financial cooperatives.  
 
There are three types of Islamic banking institutions, of which the first two fall into the legal 
category of commercial banks:  
 
  Full-fledged Islamic commercial banks:   Bank Umum Syariah  (BUS) 
  Islamic banking units of commercial banks:  Unit Usaha Syariah (UUS) 
  Islamic rural banks:        Bank Perkreditan Rakyat Syariah (BPRS) 
 
The Indonesian banking law recognizes two types of banking institutions: commercial banks 
and rural banks (BPR), with widely differing minimal capital requirements. The Islamic 
commercial banks and commercial banking units are a subcategory of the commercial 
banks, the Islamic rural banks (BPRS) a subcategory of the rural banks (BPR). The 
subcategories are included in the respective banking statistics by the central bank.  
 
The Islamic financial cooperatives in Indonesia are not part of the formal financial sector. 
They may be registered with the Ministry of Cooperatives or be unregistered; accordingly, 
they may be placed into the semiformal and the informal financial sector, respectively. As 
they are not formally regulated, the distinction is of limited relevance. Initiated by a group of 
Muslim intellectuals and promoted by PINBUK, they are generally referred to as BMT as a 
generic term. Their development has been favored by the Muslim organizations Nadhatul 
Ulama and Muhamadiyah, but were not established by them. Since 1999 when 
Muhamadiyah began to provide guidance and supervision through Pusat Pengembangan 
Ekonomi Muhammadiyah (PPEM), one of its departments, a differentiation has occurred: 
 
  BMT  Baitul Maal wat Tamwil, comprising about 95% of Islamic cooperatives, with 
affinity to Nadhatul Ulama (NU), with almost 40m members the largest Islamic 
mass organization in Indonesia; however, NU does not play an active role in 
guiding and supervising BMT. These are under the guidance of PINBUK; 
statistics on BMT usually include the BTM (unless otherwise stated). 
  BTM  Baitul Tamwil Muhamadiyah, comprising about 5% of Islamic cooperatives, 
guided since 1999 by Muhamadiyah, with some 25 million members the 
second-largest Islamic mass organization in Indonesia. BTM are informally 
supervised by PPEM. 
 
BMT reportedly have a mixed commercial and social orientation, while BTM have a more 
definite commercial orientation. 
 
The concept of microfinance is ambiguous in Indonesia. In a wider and internationally 
recognized sense, microfinance institutions (MFIs) include institutions of the formal, 
semiformal and informal financial sectors providing small-scale financial services to the lower 
segments of the population. Examples are the units of the BRI Microbanking Division and the 
rural banks (BPR) as part of the formal financial sector; various types of cooperatives and the 
so-called village banks (bank desa), which are part of the semiformal financial sector outside 
the regulation and supervision of the financial authorities; and a wide variety of self-help 
  7groups, channelling groups and rotating savings and credit associations (ROSCAs, arisan) 
as part of the informal financial sector.  
 
In a narrower sense, microfinance institutions loosely comprise a variety of semiformal 
financial institutions targeted by the draft law of September 2001 on Lembaga Keuangan 
Mikro (LKM), which literally means microfinance institutions. A number of cooperatives, 
larger self-help groups and associations of smaller ones refer to themselves as LKM in 
anticipation of the law, even though the future of that law is uncertain. The draft law does not 
include the microfinance institutions of the formal sector such as the BRI units and the rural 
banks (BPR) which fall under the banking law.  In this report, Islamic microfinance comprises 
sharia rural banks (BPRS) and sharia cooperatives (BMT, BTM). 
 
3.2   Institutional and regulatory framework: mainstreaming Islamic banking  
 
Bank Indonesia (2002:16) has provided the following vision & mission of sharia banking 
development in Indonesia: “A sound sharia banking system that is competitive, efficient and 
compliant with prudential practices, and capable of supporting real economic sector through 
the implementation of share based financing and trades with real underlying transactions in 
the spirit of brotherhood and good deeds to promote well-being for all society.” The strategic 
objectives of sharia banking development, according to Bank Indonesia (2002:5), include: 
 
•  High level of competitiveness while complying with sharia principles 
•  Significant roles in sustaining national economy and public welfare 
•  Global competitiveness through compliance to international operational standards 
 
As of 1998 (Act. No. 10), Bank Indonesia gave official recognition, as part of the new banking 
act, to the existence of a dual banking system, conventional and sharia-based. The 
mainstreaming of Islamic banking was backed by Act No. 23 of 1999 concerning Bank 
Indonesia, which authorizes the central bank to also conduct its task according to sharia 
principles” (see chapter 2.1). Beyond this, the law does not specify any substantively 
different provisions for Islamic banking. In 1999 Bank Indonesia established a team of sharia 
banking, converted in 2001 into a bureau and in 2003 into a directorate, with the objective of 
monitoring the new segment of the banking sector. At national and institutional levels, Islamic 
finance is supervised by sharia supervisory boards (SSB). On the whole, Bank Indonesia 
(2002:11) states that there is a “lack of efficient institutional structure supporting efficient 
sharia banking operations” and suggests to develop the following: 
 
•  Sharia auditor to ensure the compliance of sharia banks with sharia principles 
•  Communication Board (FKPPS) to enable an effective coordination of the effort to 
improve public awareness and education for sharia banking 
•  Institution for Sharia Financing Insurance to provide financial protection to sharia 
banks against fraudulent practices by recommended customers 
•  Sharia Finance Information Center as a linkage between the real and the sharia 
finance sector  
•  Special Purpose Company to facilitate asset securitization for Islamic banks  
 
Major stakeholders, according to Bank Indonesia (2002:5), are: 
 
•  Sharia commercial banks, sharia banking units and sharia rural banks 
•  BI as banking regulatory and supervisory authority 
•  National sharia council (DSN) 
•  Muamalat arbitrage body (BAMUI) 
•  Other sharia financial institutions: Takaful (sharia insurance), cooperatives, BAZIS, 
and sharia security companies 
  8•  Other regulatory bodies: Ministry of Finance and the capital market regulatory body 
(BAPEPAM) 
•  Universities and educational institutions with sharia finance and economics programs, 
•  Sharia-related organisations and companies such as sharia economic society (MES), 
association of national sharia banks, Jakarta Stock Exchange,  
•  The general public. 
 
3.3  Origins and development of Islamic commercial and rural banks  
 
Beginnings: In 1990, a meeting of Ulama, ie Islamic scholars, was convened in Indonesia 
on the prohibition of riba, or interest, as demanded by the Koran (Qur’an). In 1991 a technical 
team was formed, and steps were taken to establish Islamic commercial and rural banks. 
The first four Islamic rural banks (BPRS) were licensed and almost immediately opened 
during the second half of 1991: three in the Bandung area and one in Aceh. Five more were 
licensed, and all but one of them opened in 1992. Approval for the establishment of the first 
Islamic commercial bank, Bank Muammalat Indonesia (BMI), was granted in1991; the 
licence was obtained in May 1992. Toward the end of 1992, Asbisindo (Asosiasi Bank Islam 
Indonesia ) was established, originally as an association of BPRS. In 1998, it was renamed 
Asosiasi Bank Syariah Indonesia comprising both rural and commercial banks as members, 
but keeping the original acronym. 
 
Growth of Islamic commercial banking: A new phase of Islamic commercial banking 
development was initiated in 1999 when a second commercial sharia bank was established, 
Bank Syariah Mandiri.
12 In the same year, the first sharia unit of a commercial bank was 
established. By December 2003, the number of Islamic commercial banks still stood at two, 
while the number of commercial banking units had grown to eight, comprising a total of 255 
banking offices. (Table 3.2) Most remarkable has been the doubling of the number of bank 
offices of the Islamic commercial banks and banking units between Dec. 2002 and Dec. 
2003: from 127 to 255. This was paralleled by the near-doubling of banking assets from Rp 
4.02tr to Rp 7.86tr – an increase of 96% in nominal and 91% in real terms. (Table 3.3) 
 
Table 3.2:  The evolution of Islamic commercial banks 
No.  Phase  Period  Number of banks and Islamic units 
1  Establishment, no institutional growth  1992-1998  1 
2  Gradual expansion   1999-2003  10 
 
Stagnating Islamic rural banks: The growth pattern of Islamic rural banks was quite 
different. After an initial period of gradualgrowth until 1996 when they reached a total of 71, 
their number almost stagnated, reaching 78 by 1998 and a mere 84 by 2003. During the four-
year period, 1999-2003, the number of Islamic rural banks grew by a meagre 8% from 78 to 




Table 3.3:  The evolution of Islamic rural banks (BPRS) 
No.  Phase  Period  Number of Islamic rural banks 
1  Gradual expansion  1991-1996  71 
2  Slow-down of expansion   1997-1998  78 
3 Stagnation  1999-2003  84 
 
                                                 
12 Bank Mandiri, which owns Bank Syariah Mandiri as a 100% shareholder, acquired a small 
conventional commercial bank, Bank Susila Bakti, and converted it into a separate Islamic bank. 
13 There are no statistics on the number of branches of rural banks. In our sample study of five BPRS, 
the average number of branches was 2.0. If we generalize this, we arrive at a total number of 168 
BPRS branches and a total number of Islamic commercial and rural bank offices of 517. 
  9During 2003 when Islamic commercial banks doubled their assets, the number of BPRS 
grew by only one unit, their total assets by a mere 16% (11% in real terms).
14 (Table 3.5) 
 
Table 3.5: Growth of Islamic banking, 1991-2003 
Type of Islamic bank  1991  1992  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003 
Commercial banks  0  1  2  2  2  2  2 
Commercial banking units  0  0  1  3  3  6  8 
No. of commercial banking offices  0  1  40  62  96  127  255 
Rural banks  4  9  78  78  81  83  84 
Total number of institutions  4  10  81  83  86  91  94 
Total number of offices (A)  4  10  118  140  177  210  349 
Total number of offices (B) incl. 
rural bank branches 
        517 
 
Lack of popular demand: There is no indication that the establishment of Islamic banks in 
Indonesia was preceded by a broad popular demand for sharia-based Islamic financial 
services. This situation appears to have changed little. According to surveys carried out in 
several provinces with an average Muslim population of 97%, only 11% were found to 
understand products and benefits of sharia banking. Bank Indonesia (2002:10) thus 
concluded that,  
 
“There is still a gap between needs and knowledge of sharia financial products and services. 
The gap could delay the success to mobilise potential public fund to investment because of low 
switching rate from potential demand to real demand. Furthermore, the gap will also make 
marketing and selling effort for sharia banking products and services more difficult.”  
 
3.4  Conventional and Islamic commercial banking: a comparison 
 
There are 138 commercial banks in Indonesia, among them two Islamic commercial banks: 
Bank Muamalat Indonesia and Bank Syariah Mandiri. In addition, there are eight Islamic 
banking units: Bank IFI, Bank Negara Indonesia, Bank Jabar, Bank Rakyat Indonesia, Bank 
Danamon, Bank Bukopin, Bank Internasional Indonesia and HSBC, the latter a foreign bank. 
Of particular relevance is the entry of HSBC as a foreign non-Islamic bank into Islamic 
banking operations, indicating that the prospects for Islamic banking in Indonesia are 
attractive to foreign investors.  
 
In terms of numbers, the two Islamic commercial banks represent 1.4% of all 
commercial banks. If we treat the eight commercial banking units like separate 
commercial banks and add them to the total number, then the Islamic commercial 
banks and commercial banking units account for 6.8% of  the total number of 146 
banks and banking units. The Islamic bank offices account for 3.3% of all commercial 
banking offices if the BRI units are excluded, and for 2.2% if they are included. In 
terms of total banking assets and financial activities,  
   Islamic banks and banking units represent a mere 0.74% of total banking assets,  
0.64% of total deposits and 1.16% of total loans outstanding.  
 
The share in total assets remains the same with or without rural banks; it also 
remains the same if we add financial cooperatives. While Islamic commercial banking 
thus represents but a small proportion of overall commercial banking in Indonesia, their 
growth in recent years has been phenomenal:  
                                                 
14 As of May 2004, one new sharia commercial bank (by converting Bank Tugu into Bank Mega 
Syariah), five sharia district development bank units (BPD), four private commercial bank units  and 
fifteen BPRS are in the process of being established. This will bring the total to 20 commercial banks 
and banking units and 99 BPRS. 
  10  Their share in terms of total assets more than quadrupled from 0.17% in December 2000 
to 0.74% in December 2003; deposits more than quadrupled from 0.15% to 0.64%; and 
financings almost tripled from 0.40% to 1.16%. (Table 3.3; see also App. 3 Table 1) 
 
Table 3.6:   Share of Islamic to national commercial banking activities, 2000 – 2003 (in %) 
Item 2000  2001  2002    2003 
Assets  0.17 0.25 0.36 0.74 
Deposits  0.15 0.23 0.35 0.64 
Loans (or:  financing)  0.40 0.57 0.80 1.16 
Sources: BI 2003:127; BI 1/2004:13 
 
Most remarkable is the difference in performance between conventional and Islamic 
commercial banks. In relative terms, (i) the Islamic banks lend more of the funds deposited, 
with a LDR or FDR of 97% compared to 54% of the total commercial banking sector; (ii) their 
gross non-performing loans (NPL) ratio is persistently lower, and the improvement of their 
performance faster than that of conventional banks after the financial crisis. Non-performing 
loans amount to 2.3% of financings outstanding ,which is far below the 8.2% of the total 
commercial banking sector. 
15 NPL ratios fell as follows (see App. 3 Table 2): 
•  Conventional banks:  from 26.8% in 2000 to 14.1% in 2001 and 8.2% in 2003; 
•  Islamic banks:   from 13.0% in 2000 to 4.0% in 2001 and 2.3% in 2003.  
 
However, despite the Islamic banks’ better performance in terms of portfolio quality, their 
returns on average assets of 0.65% are less than a third of those of the total commercial 
banking sector at 2.12%. This difference is partially attributed to the increase in the number 
of Islamic banking units, which have only recently started to lend, with a major portion of their 
loans not yet matured. This explains their higher capital adequacy ratios (CAR) as indicated 
below and the overall decline in the profitability of Islamic commercial banks and banking 
units from 1.2% in 2001 to 0.6% in (November) 2003. (See App. 3 Table 3)
16 
 
3.5  Development of Islamic financial cooperatives  
 
The development of Islamic banking has been paralleled by that of Islamic financial 
cooperatives, BMT. The first Islamic cooperative, Ridho Gusti, was established in 1990 in 
Bandung. After 1995 when PINBUK started promoting Islamic cooperatives under the new 
name BMT, their number evolved in several stages: an initial period of moderate growth up 
to 1995; the promotion of rapid growth by PINBUK starting in 1995, with big jumps in 
numbers during the crisis years 1997 and 1998; a slowing-down of growth during 2000, 
followed first by stagnation and then decline.
17 
 
Table 3.7:  The evolution of Islamic cooperatives 
No.  Phase  Period  Number of BMT 
1  Initial growth  1990-1995  300 








3  Slowing-down of growth  2000  2,938 






                                                 
15 The NPF ratio of 2.3% comprises 1.04% sub-standard, 0.29% doubtful and 1.0% losses. 
16 For further information on deposits and loans by Islamic commercial banks see App. 3 Tables 4-5. 
17 Always with the proviso that available data are of poor quality. 
18 Based on oral information by PINBUK.  
  114. Islamic rural banks (BPRS) 
 
4.1  Conventional and Islamic rural banks (BPR and BPRS): a comparison 
 
Conventional and Islamic rural banks evolved over a similar time span, in a predominantly 
Islamic country: conventional rural banks since 1989, Islamic rural banks since 1991. At 
which pace and with what result in a predominantly Islamic country? During the 15-year 
period 1989-2003, the total BPR sector had grown to 2134
1, comprising 2050 conventional 
BPR and 84 BPRS. The average growth rate of the conventional BPR during the 15-year 
period was 137 institutions per year – compared to only 6.5 BPRS p.a. during a 13-year 
period. Conventional rural banks have thus grown more than twenty times faster than 
Islamic rural banks per year. 
 
During the six-year period, 1991-96, when their number had reached 71, the BPRS grew at 
an overall average of 12 per year. During the two years when the Asian financial crisis hit 
Indonesia, 1997 and 1998, their growth slowed down to less than four per year. During the 
following five years, 1999-2003, their net growth almost stagnated, averaging one per year: 
seven  were newly established, two were closed at the beginning of 2004. Their total number 
was 84 in December 2003 (declining to 82 in February 2004). Detailed data are presented in 
Appendix 2. 
 
With Rp 191.75bn in total assets (Dec. 2003), the Islamic rural banks account for 1.5% of 
the regulated BPR sector. Total assets per BPRS are on average of Rp 2.28bn or US$ 
270,100 per BPRS, compared to Rp 6.05bn or US$ 715,300 per BPR. With 38% of the 
assets of an average BPR, BPRS are thus much smaller.  
 
BPRS account for 1.5% of loans (financings) outstanding, but only 1.2% of deposits of the 
total BPR sector. Historically, the share of BPRS in total assets of the BPR sector grew from 
0.75% in 1993 to a high of 2.93% in 1998, paralleled by increases in the share of loans 
outstanding from 0.62% in 1993 to a high of 2.88% in 1998 and in the share of deposits from 
0.62% in 1993 to a high of 2.42% in 1998. The decline in the share of BPRS since 1999 is 
due to wide discrepancies in the growth rates of BPR and BPRS in recent years as shown in 
the following table. During the three-year period Dec. 2000 to Dec. 2003, total assets of the 
BPR sector grew (nominally) by 173%, the assets of the BPRS by 70% - despite the fact 
that the total number of BPR declined by 12% from 2419 to 2,123, while the number of BPRS 
increased by 5% from 80 to 84 during that period. 
 
Table 4.1:   Growth rates of BPR and BPRS over three-years, Dec. 2000-2003 (in %) 
 BPR  sector  BPRS 
Total assets  173  70 
Deposits 189  76 
Loans outstanding  154  68 
 
In terms of total numbers, BPRS account for about 4% of the BPR sector, in terms of total 
assets for 1.5%. The average Islamic BPR is thus less than half the size of the average 
conventional BPR. As capital shortage is one of the main reasons for the failure of many 
unregulated small financial institutions to transform into regulated BPR, and as most BPRS 
are so much smaller than conventional BPR, we may hypothesize that capital shortage is 
one of the causes of the slow growth of the Islamic rural banking sector. 
                                                  
1 62% of them newly established, 38% converted from existing non-banking institutions. 
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Table 4.2:  Conventional and Islamic rural banks (BPR and BPRS), Dec. 2003 (amounts 
in billion Rp) 
BPRS   Total  BPR 
sector 
Conventional 
BPR  Absolute  % of total 
No. of banks   2134  2050  84  3.9 
Total assets   12,905.7  12,714  191.75  1.5 
Total deposits  8,890  8,780  110.0  1.2 
Total loans outstanding  9,180  9,041  138.6  1.5 
 
In sum, Islamic rural banks account for 2.4% of the total Islamic commercial and rural 
banking sector, 1.5% of the rural banking sector, and 0.018% of the total banking sector. 
Their growth has lagged far behind that of conventional rural banks: 
  The number of BPRS grew annually at a rate of 6.5 banks, conventional BPR at a 
rate of 137. 
  Average assets of BPRS amount to only 38% of the assets of conventional BPR. 
  During 2001-2003, total assets of the BPRS grew (nominally) by 70%, compared to a 
growth rate of 173% of the total BPR sector.  
 
4.2 Regional  distribution 
 
Of 90 BPRS ever licensed between 1991 and June 2004, 86 are still active. Two have been 
closed and another two are in the process of being closed, all four located in western Java. 
The majority of BPRS, 62%, are located on Java (where the majority of the population of 
Indonesia lives), mostly in western Java (41%), which comprises the provinces of West Java 
and Banten. 20 BPRS, or 23%, are spread over seven provinces on Sumatra, with the 
largest number, namely five each, in Aceh and North Sumatra. The other ones are spread 
very thinly over the remaining archipelago. (App. 4 Table 1) The geographical distribution by 
major island and province is shown in the map below. A complete list of all BPRS and their 
locations is given in Annex 1.  
 
4.3  Mission, ownership and governance  
 
The mission of Islamic rural banks in Indonesia is helping the enterprising poor, particularly 
small traders and microentrepreneurs. In four sample BPRS, the average percentage of 
clients below the official poverty line was estimated at 6%. The explicit emphasis of the 
Islamic MFIs on the poor is in contrast to conventional BPR which are oriented to profit-
making. Two problems have resulted from the way the BPRS have defined their mission: On 
the demand side, many of the customers have a (mistaken) concept of low or no interest 
rates or profit margins in sharia banking. On the supply side, BPRS focus on the microsector 
instead of starting with more profitable market segments such as salary earners and small 
entrepreneurs. It is this difference in mission which has contributed to the slow growth of 
BPRS. While both are (mostly) established by wealthy local people, the owners of BPR have 
a commercial orientation with the objective of increasing their wealth, while the owners of 
BPRS have a social mission, combined with the intention to at least cover their costs.  
 
Ownership: Most BPRS are privately owned, usually by one majority shareholder and 
several minority shareholders. In the five sample BPRS, there are between three and 118 
owners, mostly private individuals (App. 4 Table 2). In some cases, Islamic foundations, 
companies and local government are shareholders. Some Islamic cooperatives, BMT, have 
initiated the establishment of a BPRS, but due to lack of capital are not shareholders. Most 
owners are absentee owners, living in Jakarta or a provincial capital. If there are many 
shareholders, their involvement in decision-making is small if not absent. In contrast, many 
owners of conventional BPR also act as general managers or president-directors. 
 
 13Map 1:  
 
Board of directors:  Every BPRS has three boards: a sharia board which watches over 
Islamic principles, a management board and a supervisory board. Members of the sharia 
board usually come from religious organizations like the local Majlis Ulama, from mass 
organizations and Islamic universities. The supervisory board of commissioners (komisaris) 
comprises representatives of majority shareholders and financial experts.  There are usually 
three members on the sharia board and three on the supervisory board. It is rare that anyone 
of them has a regular full-time or part-time position; most of them act perhaps one day a 
month or upon request. The management board usually comprises a director and a deputy 
director, which are both full-time employees. In the five sample BPRS, the board of directors 
has between seven and ten members (Table ). 
 
Management, upon the insistence of Bank Indonesia as the regulator, is usually comprised 
of one or two directors with banking experience. Due to the recent history of Islamic banking 
and an overall shortage of trained bankers, Very few BPRS managers have any experience 
in sbanking. Most are retirees from conventional banking, who have received some training 
in Islamic banking principles. This has resulted in a selection of older people frequently from 
state banks, lacking perhaps in drive and innovativeness as one might expect from younger 
people eager to experiment  with fresh ideas in Islamic banking. Management is considered 
largely autonomous, sometimes too autonomous and uncontrolled, particularly in a situation 
of absentee ownership combined with management by retired state bankers experienced in 
enforcing bureaucratic rules rather than exploring new products and customer segments.  No 
evidence was found of frequently emerging controversial issues between management, 
board and shareholders. Decision-making is by consensus musyawarah. Lack of 
management skill and dynamics are considered the only major problem.   
 
 
 14Control and supervision:  Internal control is by absentee commissioners whose activities 
are limited to receiving monthly reports and monthly or quarterly visits: either the 
commissioners visiting the bank; or the bank visiting the commissioners – sometimes in far-
away places. Their role is generally considered not very effective - hence the considerable 
autonomy of management! External auditing by a public accountant is compulsory if assets 
exceed Rp 10bn; but most lack dynamic growth and remain below that limit. Asbisindo, the 
business association of Islamic bank, recommends voluntary external auditing, which is 
problematic as historical experience has shown.  Supervision of BPRS as part of the banking 
system is compulsory and carried out by Bank Indonesia on an annual basis. Accounting and 
reporting standard, including the computation of standard performance ratios, are regulated 
and enforced by Bank Indonesia. 
 
4.4 Delivery  system 
 
There are no statistics on the number of branches of BPRS. In its official reports BI lists the 
number of delivery units of commercial banks only. Of the five sample BPRS only one is a 
unit bank; the other four have been one and four branches. The average number of delivery 
units (including the head-office) is three. The sample BPRS have between 11 and 38 staff 
members, averaging 21.4 per BPRS and 4.3 per delivery unit. Half the staff members (49%) 
are loan officers, usually equipped with motorbikes. The service radius is between 20 and 50 
km, averaging 38 km. App. 4 Table 3) 
 
Incentive scheme:  Most BPRS have a system performance incentive scheme based on an 
annual bonus which is related to the bank’s profit, but not to the performance of individual 
staff members. There is an on-going discussion on how to adjust staff remuneration to the 
profit-sharing principle of Islamic banking, with a basic salary to cover transportation and an 
advance, and a sharing of the profit between owners and staff according to an agreed-upon 
ratio. BPRS Mentari in Garut is experimenting along these lines. 
 
4.5  Market and outreach 
 
Market segment: The BPRS market segment covers the enterprising poor with existing 
enterprises, predominantly small traders.  BPRS are open to all, irrespective of their religion. 
Outside religious organizations, there seems to be no public debate over interest rates and 
principles of conventional vs. Islamic banking. It appears that Islamic banking is a matter of 
access and effectiveness rather than religious conviction. Ultimately, Islamic banking in 
Indonesia will have to prove its worth in terms of outreach and quality of service. 
  There does not seem to be a public awareness of Islamic economics and banking, 
nor any widespread demand for such services from the target group.  
 
Depositor and borrower outreach: Figures on outreach are highly problematic as banks 
normally report amounts of deposits and loans outstanding, but rarely if ever the number of 
depositors and borrowers. BPR as well as the BRI units provide data on the number of 
deposit accounts and loan accounts, which must not be confused with the number of clients, 
as one client might hold several accounts. This is less likely with regard to loan accounts, 
which are thus close to the number of borrowers.  
 
There are no overall statistics on the number of clients of BPRS. According to official 
statistics, total depositor outreach of the BRP sector as of 2003 is 5.5 million. The average 
number of depositors per BPR is 2,594
2 (see App. 1 Table 1). As BPRS have only 38% of 
                                                  
2 Compared to an average depositor outreach of 7,374 per BRI unit. 
 15the asset size of BPR, one might expect an average of less than 1,000 depositors.
3 Total 
depositor outreach of the 84 BPRS might be estimated at 83,000
4. 
 
Total borrower outreach of the BPR sector as of 2003 is 2.0 million, with an average of 934 
per BPR.
5 If we assume that, as in the case of assets, the average number of borrowers of 
an BPRS is 38% of that of a BPR, we arrive at a figure of 355 and a total borrower outreach 
of all 84 BPRS of around 30,000.
6 
 
Composition of clients: There are no overall statistics. In our five sample BPRS, most of 
the clients, on average 79% per BPRS, are small traders and microentrepreneurs; 17% are 
wage and salary earners, 3% are farmers. The percentage of women clients varies from 0 to 
45%, with an average of 28%. About 5% are estimated to be below the official poverty line. 
(App. 4 Table 5) 
 
Financial products for the poor and non-poor: Under sharia there are two models of client 
selection: (i) clients with existing businesses and successful operations for at least two years. 
(ii) new entrepreneurs without preceding business experience. The vast majority of clients 
are those with existing business and a good track record; they can be financed through such 
financial products as Murabahah, Musyarakah and Mudarabah, which involve some form of 
profit-sharing. New clients without a track record are considered very risky and represent but 
a small minority; they can be financed through Qard al-Hassan, soft loans without any charge 
or profit-sharing. It is argued that not everyone is a born (micro-) entrepreneur; many of the 
poor lack the qualification to become entrepreneurs and should rather become workers in 
larger enterprises, which may in turn be financed through financial institutions. Consumer 
loans and loans for speculative investments, which could be ruinous to the borrower, are 
excluded from the range of permissible purposes of financing. 
 
4.6  Total assets and sources of funds 
 
Total assets of the BPRS, according to the consolidated balance sheet of all BPRS as of 
Dec. 2003 compiled by Bank Indonesia, amount to Rp 191.75bn, or an average of Rp 2.28bn 
(US$ 270,000) per BPRS. At 38% the size of an average BPR and 37% the size of an 
average conventional BPR, BPRS are thus much smaller than conventional BPR. Total 
assets in our five sample BPRS range from Rp 1.40bn to Rp 12.6bn; the average is Rp 
7.10bn, which is more than three times the size of the average BPRS and 17% above the 
size of the average BPR. (App. 4 Table 6) 
 
The main source of funds of BPRS, according to BI’s consolidated balance sheet, are 
deposits by clients amounting to Rp 110.0bn, which is 57.4% of total assets. Other main 
sources of funds are equity including reserves and profits of the current year (22.9%), bank 
deposits (11.5%) and borrowings (3.8%). Authorized capital amounts to Rp 51.45bn, paid-in 
capital to Rp 31.0bn. (App. 4 Table 7) 
                                                  
3 In four of our five sample BPRS, the average number of clients was nearly 4000, equal to the 
number of savings accounts. This unexpectedly large number of clients is related to the fact that the 
sample BPRS are more than three times the asset size of the average BPRS. 
4 Basis of calculation: 38% of the average BPR. 
5 Compared to an average borrower outreach of 766 per BRI unit.  
6 Only one of the BPRS visited, BPRS Fisabilillah, was able to give an exact number of loan accounts, 
namely 163; the number of active borrowers was given as 157.  Two BPRS estimated the number of 
borrowers at 800; BPRS Wakalumi, by far the largest in terms of assets, gave a number of 2000 
borrowers. The overall average is 941, which reflects the unusually large size of the selected BPRS. 
(App. 4 Table 4) 
 164.7 Financial  services 
 
Deposits : BPRS are less successful in deposit mobilisation than BPR. The deposit volume 
of an average BPRS is less than one-third of the sector average (Rp 1.31bn, or US$ 
155,000, compared to Rp 4.17, US$ 493,000).
 7 Among BPRS, deposits amount to 57.4% of 
total assets, among conventional BPR to 69.1% (BPR sector average: 68.9%). BPRS finance 
79.4% of their loans outstanding from deposits, BPR 96.8%. In other terms, the loans-to-
deposit ratio (LDR) of BPRS is 1.26, the LDR of BPR is 1.03. (App. 3 Table 8-9) We might 
conclude that revenue-sharing is not as attractive to depositors as a definite interest rate. 
 
Remuneration of depositors is based on the Mudarabah principle of partnership-based 
revenue-sharing between depositors and the bank. The ratios varying in the sample BPRS 
from 30:70 to 50:50. In some banks the revenue-sharing arrangements are negotiable.
8 
 
Financings (loans): Total financings (loans outstanding) of 84 BPRS as of Dec. 2003 
amount to Rp 1.65bn (US$195,200) per BPRS, compared to Rp. 4.30bn (US$ 509,000) for 
the whole BPR sector and RP 4.41bn (US$ 522,000) per conventional BPR. The share of 
loans outstanding in terms of total assets is virtually the same in BPRS and BPR (as well as 
conventional BPR), 72.3% and 71.1%, respectively. Average loans outstanding per BPR are 
Rp 4.3bn, per conventional BPR Rp 4.41bn and per BPRS Rp 1.65bn. The loans-to-deposits 
ratio is 126% in BPRS and 103% in both BPR and conventional BPR.  
 
Table 4.3:   Financings (loans outstanding) of BPRS and BPR in Rp billion and percent of 
total assets, Dec. 2003 




Average loans outstanding per bank 
in Rp bn 
1.65 4.41 4.30 
Financings in % of total assets  72.3  74.5  71.1 
FDR,  LDR  126 103 103 
 
The main loan product in BPRS is Murabahah, ie, a sales contract between bank and 
customer with a fixed profit margin for the bank. Flexible profit-sharing, which is cumbersome 
to calculate, is of minor importance. (App. 4 Table 11 + text)  
 
4.8 Economic  performance 
 
No data are available on the performance of the BPRS sector as a whole. There are 
conflicting views on how they compare to conventional BPR. Some argue that the emphasis 
on financing profitable activities only and the stricter lending terms should result in higher 
                                                  
7 Total deposits by clients in 84 BPRS amount to Rp 110.0bn, comprising Rp 58.57bn (53%) in 
passbook savings, which are voluntary and withdrawable at any time, and Rp 51.42bn (47%) in time 
deposits. In the five sample BPRS, average deposits per bank amount to Rp 4.0bn or Rp 1.0m per 
depositor. Several of the sample BPRS offer doorstep collection services. 
8 As an example, BPRS Artha Fisabilillah offers three mudharaba savings products, all voluntary and 
withdrawable at any time, which differ only by target group, one remuneration-free savings product for 
religious purposes and a fixed deposit product with different maturities. Its loan officers offer doorstep 
collection services, serving about 200 clients a day. In BPRS Harum Hikmahnugraha, the ratios for 
savings vary from 7% to 11% by client. Returns are calculated on a monthly basis. Annual averages 
vary from 7% to 12%; the unweighted mean is 8.3%. The revenue-sharing arrangements in the case 
of time deposits vary between the banks from 40:60 to 70:30. They also vary by maturity, in the case 
of BPRS  Wakalumi from 56:44 to 66:34; the figures for the other four BPRS are estimated averages. 
Returns on time deposits vary between the five BPRS from 10% to 18% p.a.; variations by maturity in 
BPRS Wakalumi are from 11.35% to 13.37% during 2003. Current accounts are usually remuneration-
free. An exception is BPRS Harum Hikmahnugraha, which pays a voluntary bonus. Some banks, like 
BPRS Artha Fisabilillah offer a savings product for religious purposes which carries no remuneration. 
(App. 4 Table 10) 
 17profits, as is in fact the case among Islamic commercial banks. But others point to the 
relatively small size of the average BPRS compared to conventional BPR, and their 
restriction to lower market segments. Our sample BPRS are not representative, as they are 
much larger than the average BPRS. In four of the five sample BPRS, non-performing loan 
(NPL) ratios are between 0 and 11%, averaging (unweighted) 4.6%. Returns on average 
assets (ROAA) vary from 2.0% to 5%, averaging 3.2%. All of the five sample BPRS have 
reported current year profits. (App. 4 Table 12) By comparison, the BRI units, as benchmark 
MFIs in Indonesia, have an NPL of 2.5% and a ROAA of 5.7%.  
 
Compared to BMI, the first Islamic commercial bank in Indonesia, BPRS pay slightly more on 
deposits but charge three to four times as much on financings, as BPRS loans are far 
smaller in size and thus more costly, and BPRS on the whole are less efficient. 
 
Two of the five case studies are presented below, the smallest and the largest of the five 
BPRS.  
 
Box 1: Two sample BPRS 
BPRS Artha Fisabilillah in Cianjur, the smallest of the five sample BPRS, was established in 1994 by 9 
shareholders. By 1997, as a result of lack of management experience, it was technically bankrupt and 
was restructured. The new management was not very dynamic and was replaced in 2001 by a retired 
BRI credit officer. The bank, located next to a local market, has 1150 savers and 163 borrowers. With 
a staff of eleven, six of them loan officers, it offers doorstep collection services to about 200 clients a 
day. It also offers deposit services to school children and institutions. Total assets are Rp 1.40bn, 
deposits Rp 0.62bn and financings outstanding Rp 1.21bn. Its overall performance is not yet 
satisfactory. Its main problem is lack of funds, due to a shortage of deposits and capital from the 
owners. The bank is struggling with loan recovery and has improved considerably in 2003. Its NPF 
ratios in 2001, 2002 and 2003 were 9.6%, 190.8% and 4.5%, respectively; its loan loss ratios were 
8.9%, 18.7% and 6.25%. Yet the bank has been in the black for the past three years, with ROAs of 
2.3%, 1.7% and 2.4% and ROEs of 7%, 4.3% and 8.75%, respectively. Its main future strategy to 
improve efficiency is staff upgrading through training. (App. 4 Table 13) 
 
BPRS Wakalumi in Ciputat, the biggest of the five sample BPRS, was established in 1990 by a 
foundation (Yayasan Wakalumi) as a conventional BPR and converted for religious reasons into a 
BPRS in 1994. It has 118 shareholders, among them BMI (19%, down from 49%), the former Minister 
of Cooperatives (23.5%), a Citybank manager (26%), the founding foundation Yaysan Wakalumi 
(5.6%) and over a hundred individuals, mostly Muslims working at Citybank. The bank seems to have 
a successful staff promotion strategy: the president director, with a B.A. in agriculture, has been with 
the bank since 1994, learning on the job and promoted up the ranks; the director, a woman with a 
diploma in accounting, has been an employee since 1997 and was promoted to director in 2003. The 
bank has grown rapidly and now has five branches and a staff of 38, 13 among them loan officers. Its 
2000 borrowers are mostly small traders on traditional markets, to whom it sells its financings as 
Islamic products. It has four financing products, with Murabahah the dominant one. Through eight 
savings products and four term deposit products, it has attracted  5000 savers. With ROAAs in 2001-
2003 of 4.1%, 3.65% and 3.35% and ROAEs of 20.3%, 21.05% and 24.1%, respectively, it is highly 
profitable: apparently a showpiece that could serve as an exposure and apprenticeship training site for 
other banks. (App. 4 Table 14) 
 
 
4.9  Affiliations and support 
 
ASBISINDO, Asosiasi Bank Syariah Indonesia,
9 was established in 1992 as an association 
of rural Islamic banks (BPRS); since 2002 its coverage also includes Islamic commercial 
banks. There are no other associations of Islamic banking institutions in Indonesia. Its 
objective is the development of Islamic banking in Indonesia through human resource 
development, technical assistance, operational standardization and financial product 
development, facilitation of vertical and horizontal communication among Islamic financial 
institutions, advocacy and participation in policy dialogue. The two Islamic commercial banks, 
                                                  
9 Formerly: Asosiasi Bank Islam Indonesia 
 187 out of 9 Syaria units of commercial banks and 82 BPRS are members of Asbisindo. Its 
main activity is the training of management and staff of Islamic commercial banks and rural 
banks. In 2003 Asbisindo offered five national courses with approximately 100 participants 
each, plus 4-7 courses with 25-30 participants per regional office. Asbisindo also issues a 
quarterly Bulletin and is in the process of preparing a directory of Islamic banking institutions.  
 
Asbisindo comprises a head office in Jakarta, housed by Bank Indonesia, and 10 regional 
offices. It is run by a board and an executive secretary (Basril). The head office has a total 
staff of three; the regional offices, with training as their main function, have a staff of one or 
two each. The board has 14 members from Islamic commercial and rural banks, chaired by 
Wahyu Dwi Agung who is also an assistant director of BMI and a commissioner of three 
BPRS. Basic costs are funded from membership fees, Rp 5m per commercial bank or unit 
and Rp 1.2m per BPRS per year. The training costs are borne by the participants. Through 
special projects, Bank Indonesia supports workshops and seminars. There are no 
international donors; Asbisindo does not receive any technical assistance from any source.  
Asbisindo maintains close relationships with Bank Indonesia, the national Syaria board Majlis 
Ulama Indonesia/Dewan Syaria Nasional (MUI/DSN), the national legislative council of 
Indonesia (DPR) and various business associations. 
 
Asbisindo’s future plans are to become a strong association to provide a full range of 
services to all Islamic banking institutions as its members; and to contribute substantially to 
their growth and strength. Among its future services are a certified Islamic bankers training 
program recognized and approved by Bank Indonesia. In cooperation with the Islamic 
Banking Directorate of Bank Indonesia, it is also working on a draft Islamic financial 
institutions law. Asbisindo needs donor assistance in the preparation of a certified Islamic 
bankers training program and of an Islamic banking law.  
 
PNM refinances BPR and BPRS and other conventional and Islamic financial institutions and 
supports their capacity development (see chapter 6.8). 
 
Majlis Ulama is an organization of Islamic scholars which maintains relations with many 
Islamic banking institutions. It is the initiator of Islamic banking in Indonesia and a 
shareholder of BMI, the first Islamic commercial bank. Its head office is in Jakarta. It also 
maintains offices in provinces and districts, where it plays both a socialeconomic and a 
political role. 
 
4.10  Perceptions of Islamic banking by the public 
 
In 2000, after ten years of Islamic banking development in Indonesia, Bank Indonesia 
realized that “the Syariah Banks in Indonesia do not grow fastly in terms of their networking 
as well as size of production compared to the conventional banks… (and that ) their 
development is not based on infant industries argument which needs protection and special 
rights.” (BI & RCDS 2000:2) Arguing that the development of Syariah Banks not only 
depends on the legal framework and the moral values applied in the banks’ operations, but 
also on “society’s demand for their products and services”, it commissioned interview studies 
in western and central Java to find out whether such a demand exists; or whether the lack of 
market demand for specifically Islamic financial services might be one of the explanations for 
their slow growth. The results are presented in BI & RCDS (2000) and Ratnawati et al. 
(2000) of Diponegoro University in Semarang.  
 
The results of the study in central Java were not very revealing and ultimately inconclusive.
10 
It was found that there were three groups of respondents: those  who wanted to deal with 
Syariah Banks, those did not, and those who were neutral; that age and education had an 
influence on attitudes to Syariah banks; and that some regions (Semarang, Pekalongan, 
                                                  
10 Data analysis is based on logistic regression modeling (logit); the presentation is incomprehensible.  
 19Kendal, Surakarta and Yogyakarta) were more receptive to Islamic banking than others. It 
was recommended to”intensify socialization through interpersonal media, electronic media, 
as well as printed media.” (BI & RCDS 2000: 21-23) 
 
In contrast, the study in West Java arrived at unequivocal conclusions:  
 
“In general, the performance of syaria bank, in the present time, is far behind compared to its 
older brother of conventional bank: 
1. People prefer a bank system for its better service in general, facilities provided, credibility, 
and bank status, while on the other hand people tend to avoid syaria bank for their… limited 
services and facilities, faint status, and low credibility. 
2. People who are open to information and have extensive access to it tend to discontinue (as 
customer) in being a syaria bank customer or refuse (not yet as customer) to adopt such a 
system. This shows that syaria bank performance is considered inferior to the conventional 
banks”. (Ratnawati 2000:18) 
 
These conclusions concur with our own observations that there is little popular demand for 
Islamic banking services; and that their choice is more (though not exclusively) a matter of 
proximity and convenience that religion. They also concur with the anecdotal observations of 
the ADB (2003) team, which included a number of BMT in their studies of MFIs and in one of 
them, BMT Al-Iman in Pandeglang District in Banten Province, interviewed three (of 1,066) 
members, who all gave convenience as the main reason for their patronage. 
 
 
Box 2:   Reasons for their patronage among customers of BMT Al-Imam, Pandeglang District 
“Three clients of the BMT were interviewed: The first was a woman, a primary school teacher, who 
had come to make a small deposit into her savings account which had reached a balance of Rp. 1.6 
million. She is not a member of the BMT as she has not made the initial deposit required of members. 
The main reasons for her patronage of this BMT was its convenient location to her home and the 
relaxed environment with seldom, if ever, a need to form a queue and wait in line.  
The second client interviewed was a man, a member of the BMT who has two savings accounts. One 
is a normal current account with a balance of Rp. 100,000 and the other is the savings account 
designed to meet the annual needs of Moslems during the Idul Fitri celebration in December when he 
expects to withdraw the full amount which by that time will have reached Rp. 300,000. This client also 
cited convenience and flexibility as a reason for becoming a member of the BMT. 
The third client interviewed was a man, a well-off farmer who owns 1.2 ha for the purpose of paddy 
and vegetable production. This man has four savings accounts with the BMT, the combined total of 
which was Rp. 6.38 million. The reasons given for patronage of the BMT was cited as the quick and 
convenient services provided including personalized service whereby on occasion the staff deliver the 
service to his door.” 
(ADB 2003, Regional Profile Section VII, Banten (Pandeglang District) 
 
 205.   Islamic cooperatives (BMT, BTM) 
 
5.1   Conventional and Islamic cooperatives: a comparison 
Indonesia has a differentiated sector of cooperatives, which has been historically dominated 
by the heavily subsidized KUD system: Koperasi Unit Desa, multi-purpose cooperatives at 
sub-district level with units at village level. By law all co-operatives had to be integrated into 
the KUD system. As government intervention in management and resource allocation stifled 
any spirit of autonomy and self-help, privately organized credit unions and large numbers of 
self-help groups resisted being incorporated, including the self-help groups under Bank 
Indonesia’s Program Linking Banks and Self-Help Groups (PHBK). In recent years, ie, since 
the downfall of the Suharto regime, the cooperative sector has seen some liberalization, but 
is still far from self-organization and autonomy. In fact, the very existence of a Ministry of 
Cooperatives, with unclear and perhaps counterproductive functions, stands in the way. In 
the framework of the new decentralization law, cooperatives are now being registered 
autonomously in the districts and provinces, which is likely to make the task of regulation and 
supervision more difficult. The lack of authority of the Ministry of Cooperatives is reflected in 
the no-reply rate of 73% among KSP/USK reported by the Ministry as of 13 April 2004. There 
is no national organization of financial cooperatives – as an alternative to a Ministry of 
Cooperatives - which could take over the apex functions of liquidity exchange, regulation and 
supervision.   
 
Financial cooperatives are part of the cooperative sector and have similarly suffered from 
state interference and subsidization. As financial institutions, they should be prudentially 
regulated and properly supervised by a financial authority, but they are not. The Ministry of 
Cooperatives has been unable, Bank Indonesia and the Ministry of Finance unwilling to 
regulate and supervise them. The draft microfinance (LKM) law of 2001 seemed to prepare 
the way for incorporation into the regulated financial sector, but has been put on ice; its 
future is uncertain. An alternative, which has evolved in developed countries like Germany
1 is 
a delegated system of regulation and supervision in the hands of national and regional 
associations of financial cooperatives (turned into local cooperative banks) with their apex 
auditing federations, placed under the banking law and under the ultimate authority of a bank 
superintendency.  
 
As there is no reliable reporting system, the figures on financial cooperatives given below are 
only rough approximations; they are incomplete, based on different years and frequently 
carried forward unchanged over several years. While the Ministry of Cooperatives, now 
reorganized as the Ministry of Cooperatives and Small Enterprises, has been in charge of 
registration, regulation and supervision, it has only poorly fulfilled any of these functions. In 
actual fact, there is only limited and selective registration, inadequate regulation and virtually 
no effective supervision.  
 
The more than 40,000 financial cooperatives constitute 76% of all formal and semiformal 
MFIs listed in App. 1 Table 1.  Most of them are relatively small in outreach, comprising 
34.2% of all loan accounts and 23.5% of all deposit accounts. In terms of volume, they 
account for 18.1% of all MFI loans outstanding and 4.8% of deposits. The picture changes if 
we leave out the units of the BRI Microbanking Division, the giant on the Indonesian 
microfinance scene. Without the BRI units, financial cooperatives constitute 82.0% of all 
MFIs, 37.8% of loan accounts and 64.5% of deposit accounts; in terms of volume, they  
account for 38.9% of loans outstanding and 23.8% of deposit balances. Compared to rural 
banks (BPR) as of Dec 2003, there are 19 times as many financial cooperatives with six 
times as many borrowers and twice as many depositors, but only half the volume of loans 
outstanding and less than one-fifth of their deposit volume. (App. 5 Table 1) 
                                                  
1 The Netherlands initially followed the same evolutionary path, but eventually centralized cooperative 
banking in a single institution, Rabobank, converting the former independent financial cooperatives 
and cooperative banks into branches. 
 21The largest number of financial cooperatives are the savings and credit units (USP) of the 
state-run multipurpose cooperatives, KUD, accounting for 87% of all units, 76% of loans 
outstanding and 70% of deposits. The Savings & Credit Cooperatives, KSP, are part of the  
same KUD system but are, in contrast to USP, organizationally and financially independent 
of the KUD. Together, the reported number of USP and KSP as of ~2000 is 36,341, which 
97% of all listed conventional cooperatives and 90% of all cooperatives in Table 1.  
 
According to statistics of the Ministry of Cooperatives, the total number of KSP/USP has 
grown to 40,639 as of December 2003, which includes those credit unions and BMT which 
decided to register as cooperatives; they also include cooperatives which are inactive and 
have failed to report. The Ministry has financial information on 36,376 KSP/USP as of 
December 2003, a decrease of 0.4% in number and 8.8% in total assets as shown in the 
following table. The statistics are broken down by province, but not by Islamic vs. non-Islamic 
type. (App. 5 Table 2) 
 
The KSP and USP are on principle registered with  the Ministry of Cooperatives and are 
subject to a regulatory framework, with minimum capital requirements to become a 
cooperative, a soundness rating system (based on that for banks) and a loan classification 
system. However, deficiencies include the absence of legal lending limits, requirements for 
loan-loss provisioning (left up to individual cooperatives) and sanctions.  There is no effective 
supervision; and whatever regulation exists is not enforced after registration. Also, there is no 
deposit protection system, and there are no associations of KSP/USP. 
 
The 1,071 credit unions  (Koperasi Kredit) are privately organized and supervised by 
INKOPDIT, their national apex, which has rated 90% of them as sound. They are part of the 
world credit union movement under WOCCU. A small cooperative movement, Swamitra, has 
been organized by the state cooperative bank, BUKOPIN.  
 
The Islamic cooperatives, BMT, are a recent development, with rapid growth during the first 
part of the 1990s. Its 2,938 units (as of 2000) constitute 7.2% of all financial cooperatives, 
2.8% of deposits and 1.1% of loans outstanding (ADB (2003). The majority of them are 
registered with PINBUK, not with he Ministry of Cooperatives, which has no information on 
how many of them are registered as cooperatives. BI estimates the number of registered 
BMT at 500 out of a total of 3000. 
 
Table 5.1:   Financial cooperatives: Conventional and Islamic, ~2000* 
  Units  Deposit 
accounts in '000
Deposit volume  




in Rp bn 
Conventional  cooperatives  37,589  11,043 1,613 11,020  4,736 
Unit Simpan Pinjam (USP)  35,218  10,141  1,659  10,141 3,629 
Sav&Cr Coops (KSP)  1,123  551  1,157  551  708 
Credit Unions (CU)  1,071  296  151  296  272 
Swamitra/BUKOPIN  177  55 249 32  127 
Islamic cooperatives, BMT  2,938  400  46  73  51** 
  Total  40,527  11,443 1,659 11,093  4,787 
*Adapted from App. 1 Table 1. Estimate of number of deposit accounts based on Timberg 2003:7 
**Timberg (2003:7) reports outstandings of Rp 187bn by 2,470 BMT as of June 1998. 
 
Not separately listed in the above statistics are 1,500, mostly rural, Kopontren: financial 
cooperatives connected with Islamic colleges, Pesantren, and registered with the Ministry of 
Cooperatives.  Most of them do not follow Islamic banking practices, and their leadership 
reportedly does not want to be associated solely with Islamic finance. Only a small number, 
perhaps 10-20%, have shifted to Islamic banking. (Timberg 2003:7) 
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5.2  Sample BMT: origin and history 
 
There is a paucity of information on Islamic cooperatives. In the following we therefore rely 
heavily on the four sample BMT visited, fully aware of the pitfalls of an extremely small and 
unsystematic sample.
2 All four were selected by ASBISINDO and, for reasons of time 
constraints, all located in western Java, three in the province of West Java and one in 
Jakarta (App. 5 Table 3): 
•  BMT At-Taqwa, Kemanggisan, West-Jakarta 
•  BMT Ibaadurrahman, Sukabumi 
•  BMT Latanza, Garut 
•  BMT Wira Mandiri, Tasikmalaya. 
 
BMT At-Taqwa was first established in 1994 as a pre-cooperative under the name of Baitul 
Maal Wat-Tamwil (BMT) At-Tawqa by four members as representatives of the Mosque At-
Tawqa . The initiative had been taken by the management of the Mosque At-Taqwa and an 
employee of BMI in the neighborhood The initiative was part of PINBUK’s program of 
establishing Islamic cooperatives, which also provided training.  The start-up capital of Rp 
23m was provided by Yayasan Taqwa Bakhti which manages the Mosque, comprising Rs 
5m in fresh money and 18m in equipment. In 2000 it registered as a cooperative under the 
MoC, with 1500 members. Today, in early 2004, it has 4000 members.  
 
BMT Ibaadurrahman was established in 1992 as a BMT unit in a multi-purpose cooperative 
of a Pesantren. In response to popular demand, it started with a membership of 1500 and 
now has 3000 members. It is registered as a savings and credit cooperative unit, USP, within 
a multi-purpose cooperative since 1992.  
 
BMT Latanza was newly established in 1996 as a self-help group (KSM) through PHBK, 
Bank Indonesia’s Program Linking Banks and Self-Help Groups. It was initiated by young 
people in town, inspired by PINBUK, which also suggested the cooperation with PHBK. It 
comprises 800 members organized in 80 SHGs. 20 of the SHGs are active borrowers; 60 are 
savings groups only. In 2000 it registered as a cooperative, KSP, with the MoC.  
 
BMT Wira Mandiri was established in 1997 as a self-help group (KSM). Later in the year it 
changed its status to BMT and was registered as a cooperative of employees of Yayasan 
Wira Mandiri (YWM), a foundation. In 1999 it was registered as a Koperasi BMT (KBMT) with 
a broader membership for the purpose of savings and credit activities. Its founding 
organization, YWM, which had been established for the promoting Islamic education, is now 
dormant, but living on in the BMT.  
 
5.3 Regional  distribution 
 
PINBUK has provided a table and map of the regional distribution of BMT for Dec. 2001. The 
data for 2003 are based on changes manually inserted during our visit and need to be 
verified. According to this information, the total number of BMT has declined by 6.0%, from 
3037 reported as of December 2001 to 2856 as of December 2003 – after exceptional 
growth rates during the crisis years of 1997/98 and a slow-down in growth during 1999-2001. 
ADB 2003 (Suppl. App. C, p. 21) reports that the number of members and customers of BMT 
has been stagnating or declining in recent years.  
 
The majority of BMT, namely 65% in 2001 and 60% in 2003, like BPRS, are located on Java 
where they are spread far more equally  than BPRS over the western, central and eastern 
parts. Big declines in numbers are reported for Jakarta West Java and East Java, while 
                                                  
2 An additional case study of a BMT in Metro Lampung has been reported by ADB 2003 (Suppl. App. 
C, p. 21), with 53 members, 700 borrowers (average loan size Rp1.75 million) and 1800 depositors. 
 23numbers in Central Java und D.I. Yogyakarta have increased (provided the numbers for 
2003 are correct!). On Sumatra, their share has increased from 16% to 20%, with big jumps 
in North Sumatra and Riau. The share of BMT of the other parts has changed little between 
2001 and 2003. Compared to the registered KSP/USP, 40,639 in number, BMT are 
somewhat over-represented on Java, Sulawesi, Sumatra and West Nusa Tenggara and 
under-represented on Kalimantan and the smaller islands. (App. 5 Table 4) 
 
Of the 3037 registered BMT as of 2001, 2025, or 67%, are reported by PINBUK as reporting. 
For 2003 PINBUK has published a directory of 1257 BMT, containing name and address, 
phone number, and name of manager. This may be taken as another indicator that only 
around one-third of the BMT are active.   
 
Map 2:    Geographical distribution of BMT, 2003 
 
 245.4  Mission, legal status and governance 
 
Mission: The BMT in our sample see it as their mission to help the enterprising poor in the 
vicinity and to empower them economically. Their particular target market are very small 
microentrepreneurs including itinerant traders and food vendors (kaki-lima). ADB 2003 
(Suppl. App. C, p. 21) reports that the majority of customers of BMT are urban-based and 
provide services to both poor and non-poor households. The size of shares varies widely. In 
BMT At-Tawqa, with 4000 members, a share is Rp 10,000, little more than US$1; in a BMT 
in Metro Lampung visited by ADB 2003, with only 57 owner-members but 1800 customers, 
the size of share is Rp. one million (US$118). 
 
Legal status: According to Bank Indonesia, only about 500 of 3000 BMT are registered as 
financial cooperatives (KSP) with the MoC. All others are regarded as pre-cooperatives. With 
reference to the draft MFI law of 2001, BMT are considered by PINDUK as sharia MFIs 
(Lembaga Keuangan Mikro Syariah, LKM-S), which may be considered as semi-formal 
institutions: recognized but not regulated. All four sample BMT in our study are registered 
with the MoC. 
 
Ownership: As cooperatives, they are owned by their members. BMT At-Tawqa and BMT 
Ibaadurrahman stated that they have 4000 and 2500 member-owners, respectively. But 
many BMT make a distinction between members with voting rights and partnership members 
without. Eg, BMT Wira Mandiri has 45 voting members and 2000 partnership members. In 
the case of BMT Latanza, the owners are 80 SHGs with a total of 800 members.  
 
Board and management: Board size and composition of BMT are not standardized. The 
four sample BMT are overseen by boards comprising between three and 14 members, with 
an average of seven. They have between one and three managers.
3 
 
Internal control is generally in the hands of a supervisory board, which either meets monthly 
or is contacted as need arises. 
 
External auditing and supervision vary widely. About 500 out of 3000 BMT are estimated 
to be registered as cooperatives with the MoC. These are required to send annual reports, 
formerly to the MoC as the official supervisor, now, under decentralization, to their  
respective provincial and district cooperative authority (Dinas Koperasi).  Their function is 
effectively limited to registration and the receipt of annual reports. There are no auditing 
requirements; there is no effective supervision and no enforcement of any norms; and to our 
knowledge no official closing of non-functioning cooperatives.  
 
BMTs are expected to provide monthly reports to their regional PINBUK but only about 50% 
comply, the remaining ones being largely inactive; many report late, and the quality of 
reporting is variable. Furthermore, PINBUK has no formal supervisory powers. There is no 
performance measure used to assess the institutional quality of each BMT and there is a 
high failure rate among BMTs because of weak management (ADB 2003, Suppl. App. C, p. 
21). PINBUK states that it used to employ 10 supervisors, but these left when funding 
ceased. INKOPSYAH regularly receives monthly reports from its members (as a prerequisite 
for funding from outside sources). Reporting, though not yet standardized, consists of 
                                                  
3 BMT At-Taqwa, the largest cooperative, also has the largest board, comprising a sharia board of 
four, a supervisory (komisaris) board of five, a law and management board of four, and an internal 
control board of one, who meet monthly. BMT Ibaadurrahman has a board of supervision of three 
members only. BMT Latanza has a management board of three, a sharia board of three and a 
supervisory board of two.  BMT Wira Mandiri has a management board of 1 and a supervisory board 
of three. Two of the BMT have one, and two have three managers. Management appears to be 
strongest in BMT At-Taqwa, with a general manager, a manager of operations and a marketing 
manager; and weakest in BMT Ibaadurrahman, where the manager of the multipurpose cooperative 
and the BMT unit are identical. 
 25financial statements. There are no resources for on-site visits. Regional PUSKOP visit 
members only when invited to do so. MoC officials may attend the annual general meeting 
on invitation from the BMT. In general, enforcement, supervisory arrangements, information 




5.5  Delivery system, market and outreach 
 
No statistical information on staffing of BMT is available. In the four sample BMT, the 
average number of staff is close to four, more than half of them loan officers or collectors. 
The average service radius is about 14 km. (App. 5 Table 5) 
 
Information on total membership and customers of BMT is not available. The vast majority of 
BMT clients are small traders, many of them itinerant, and some other types of 
microentrepreneurs, mostly in urban and peri-urban areas. Of the four sample BMT, only 
Wira Mandiri includes salary earners and farmers; approximately 40% of the clients are 
women; 45% are estimated to be below the poverty line. (App. 5 Table 6)  
 
Saver outreach: There is no information on the total number of savers or deposit accounts 
of BMT. All members and clients of a BMT have a deposit account; the total number of 
clients usually equals the number of savers or savings accounts, from 800 to 4000 in the four 
sample BMT, 2325 on average. There is no information on the number of active savers. As 
the average asset size of the BMT sector is one-quarter of the size of our four sample BMT, 
it might be a reasonable estimate that the average number of depositors per BMT in the 
sector is around 580. In this case, total saver & borrower outreach would be 1.66 million; 
however, if we assume that perhaps only one-third of the listed BMT are active, the actual 
saver & client outreach may only be 550,000 (or less). 
 
Borrower outreach of the BMT sector according to Table 1 in App. 1 is 73,000, or 25 per 
BMT, a highly questionable figure. In the four sample BMT, the number of borrowers ranges 
from 200 and 500 per BMT; the average (mean) is 327 (App. 5 Table 7). As the average 
asset size of the BMT sector is one-quarter of the size of our four sample BMT, it might be a 
reasonable estimate that the average number of borrowers per BMT in the total sector is 
around 80, which would be over three times the size derived from Table 1. Total borrower 
outreach would then be around 230,000. However, if we apply the same logic as above and 
assume that only one-third of the BMT are active, actual borrower outreach would be brought 
down to 76,000 (as of 2003), which is close to the figure reported in Table. 1. 
 
5.6  Total assets and sources of funds 
 
In the absence of compulsory registration and reporting, there is no consolidated balance 
sheet. For 2001 PINBUK has provided a classification of BMT by total asset category. The 
largest BMT, 2.1% of the total number, had assets above Rp 1 billion (US$ 97,500
5); 7.3% 
had assets between Rp 500 million and Rp 1 billion. The smallest BMT, 9.5% of the total 
number, had assets below Rp 50 million (US$ 4,900); and 41.5% had assets between Rp 50 
million and 250 million. 40% were in middle category of Rp 250-500 million (US$24,400-
48,800). The median was at Rp 250 million. (App. 5 Table 8) 
                                                  
4 BMT At-Taqwa, the largest of the four BMT, states that auditing and supervision are non-existent; 
they neither report to MoC nor PINBUK. In contrast, BMT Ibaadurrahman reports every one or two 
months to its local cooperative authority, from which it has received recommendations and 
accountancy training; it was last audited in 2002. It also sends monthly reports to BMM, but has not 
received any reactions. In preparation of refinancing by BMM in the amount of Rp 25, it is now being 
audited by BMM. BMT Latenza is not being supervised. BMT Wira Mandiri is being supervised by 
PINBUK and BMM, but has never been audited. 
 
5 Average rate of exchange for 2001: Rp 10,255 to the US$. 
 26In terms of total assets, all four sample BMT are above the median of Rp 250m; the largest, 
with total assets of Rp 2.2bn, falls into the upper category. Mean total assets are close to Rp 
1 bn, which is almost four times the median and almost six times the mean size of  a 
registered cooperative, KSP/USP.  
 
Mean loans outstanding in our four sample BMT are Rp 742mn, mean deposit balances Rp 
717.5mn.  Deposits are thus the main source of funds, followed by capital. In BMT At-Taqwa, 
the largest BMT, deposits exceed loans outstanding; in BMT Ibaadurrahman and BMT Wira 
Mandiri, they almost reach the loan volume and, together with capital, exceed the loan 
volume. Only one of the four,  BMT Latanza, relies heavily on borrowings (to the tune of 34% 
of loans outstanding). The mean loan-to-deposit ratio is 103%.  (App. 5 Table 9) 
 
5.7 Financial  services 
 
The question about the difference between Islamic and comparable non-Islamic 
institutions evoked little response, except in BMT Ibaadurrahman which claims that profit-
sharing is more in the interest of the customers than interest-taking; that average profits are 
higher for both BMT and customers because of higher transparency; and that customer 
relations are stronger because of specific suggestions how to improve the business; in one 
case this led reportedly to an increase in assets from Rp 3m to Rp 41m. 
 
Deposits: No statistics on the overall deposit balances of the BMT sector are available. 
Deposits in the four sample BMT range from Rp 199mn to Rp 1,958mn; the average is Rp 
717.5mn. Deposit products are mainly based on mudarabah, ie, revenue-sharing 
arrangements between clients and BMT. They vary in the case of savings accounts vary 
from 25:75 to 40:60, averaging 34:66; in the case of time deposits, depending on maturity, 
from 35:65 to 45:55, averaging 42:58. Average returns p.a. are approximately 8.8% in the 
case of savings and 13.6% in the case of time deposits: slightly higher than the returns in 
BPRS of 8.3% and 13%, respectively. Two of the sample BMT offer current accounts, which 
are not remunerated. (App. 5 Table 10) 
 
Financings (lending): No statistics on the overall portfolio of the BMT sector are available. 
Financings outstanding in the four sample BMT range from Rp 217mn to Rp 1,819mn; the 
average is Rp 742mn, or Rp 2.3mn per borrower (compared to Rp 5.4mn per borrower in the 
five sample BPRS). The average FDR is 103%, the same as in the five sample BPRS. 
 
In contrast to the five sample BPRS where Murabahah (a sales contract between bank and 
customer with a mutually agreed-upon profit margin for the bank) is by far the most important 
loan product, accounting for 86% unweighted, the loan portfolio of the BMT is more 
balanced: Murabahah financings account for 61.5% unweighted of the loan products and is 
still the top product; but Mudarabahh, the profit-sharing product, accounts for 32% and Qard 
Al-Hassan, the interest-free/profit-sharing-free product for poor start-up borrowers, accounts 
for 3.5%. Requiring collateral is standard, comprising the title of a house, land, a car or 
motorbike, savings, or personal guarantees. Most of the loan products are tied to savings 
approximately 5% of the loan size) as part of collateral. The four BMT offer no other financial 
services and have no other business. (App. 5 Table 11-12) 
 
5.8 Economic  performance 
 
In the absence of effective regulation and supervision, the performance of BMT is quite 
uneven. Among both the registered and unregistered BMT, an unknown number of them is 
dormant. ADB (2003, Suppl. App. C, p. 21) found that in Lombok/NTB, an island known for 
the strength of its SHGs and cooperatives, only 30 out of 93 BMTs are viable. In 2001, only 
67% of the registered BMT were listed by PINBUK as reporting. PINBUK estimates that 
perhaps 900-1000 BMT are financially viable. PNM, with a mandate of strengthening BMT 
 27and other MFIs, has identified about 500 BMT, or less than one-fifth of the total number, as 
functioning and worth strengthening. 
 
No data are available on the performance of the BMT sector as a whole.  The four sample 
BMT are very large and not representative for the sector. NPL ratios vary widely, from 1.4% 
to 30%, but are mostly estimates. All four BMT show positive returns on year-end assets, 
with ROAs ranging from 0.16% to 2.7%; but these figures are not reliable as sizeable bad 
debts may not have been written off. (App. 5 Table 13-14) 
 
 
Box 3: Some findings on BMT in ADB’s rural microfinance study, 2003 
In three regional studies of MFIs by the ADB team (2003), the BRI units came out first as sustainable 
institutions with wide outreach and excellent performance; in two, the BMTs came out as complete 
failures, while in the third the BMT, after restructuring and after considerable capital injections, showed 
promise. BPRS were not found in the sample.  
In NTB, ADB studied five MFIs. It found that “the BRI Unit in Selong selects their client prudently from 
low income and well off people… In terms of viability, BRI Unit is the best with 97% loan repayment, 
making profit 187 million and has an LDR of 0.72. The second is Credit Union Karya Terpadu… The 
remaining three are not viable… and the worst is BMT Ar Rayada. (ADB 2003, Suppl. App. I)  
In Donggala District, Central Sulawesi, of five MFIs studied “only BRI shows a good performance with 
a loan repayment of 99.1  percent and a loan to deposit ratio of 0.75… The BMT Al Amin Palu has 
completely failed to show an at least sufficient performance with a Loan Repayment of 5 percent. 
There was no loan repayment data available on cooperatives.” (ADB 2003, Suppl. App. IV) 
In North Lampung District, Lampung, BRI Unit Kotabumi came again out first; but BMT Fajar was 
found “potentially sustainable.” It was “established in 1996 as a group managed by 5 members named 
Kelompok Swadaya Masyarakat (KSM).  By 1997 the membership had grown to 31 persons and 
became a cooperative. The capital originated from share savings of Rp50,000 per member. In 2002 
there was a restructuring of the management and only 53 members remain. The capital structure was 
also amended to Rp1 million for share saving and Rp5,000 contractual savings for each member per 
month. Besides capital from members, this BMT has twice received loans from PNM, Rp75 million and 
then Rp260 million. The funds have been on-lent to 700 members. There are 1,800 total savings 
accounts. BMT “Fajar” is potentially sustainable as total borrowers already reach 700 and there are 
1,800 saving accounts among a population of 135,000 people in the 5 sub-districts in its operational 
area. NPL is 9 percent and efforts are continuing for a further reduction.” (ADB 2003, Suppl. App. V) 
 
5.9  Affiliations and support 
 
PINBUK: The most important promoter of Islamic cooperatives is PINBUK, the Centre for 
Micro Enterprise Incubation, Pusat Inkubasi Bisnis Usaha Kecil, established in 1995 by 
Yayasan Inkubasi Bisnis Usaha Kecil (YINBUK), a foundation, as its operational arm. 
PINBUK has no legal status of its own, but is operationally autonomous. It acts as a facilitator 
of the establishment and licensing of new BMT, which usually receive first a certificate from 
PINBUK as a pre-cooperative (prakoperasi) or self-help group (kelompok swadaya 
masyarakat), before registering with the MoC (which most do not do). PINBUK provides 
basic, intermediate and advanced training, plus training of trainers. It offers a wide range of 
training modules. The seminars are organized by PINBUK with trainers certified as  Master of 
Training  with support from government, Colleges/Universities and NGOs (MERCICORP). 
Additionally Pinbuk has published manuals for the establishment of BMTs; regulation and 
statutes of BMT; management; computerization; and performance assessment. It is the only 
organization providing statistics on BMT, but with its small staff is unable to do so regularly. 
The last official statistics, reporting 3037 BMT, date back to 2001. 
PINBUK also supplies BMT with MIS. Along with TCTECH (TAMWIL Computerization 
Technology, Semarang) and since 2001 with PT USSI in Badang, PINBUK has development 
a software package for BMT, divided in three categories: Single User, for small scale BMTs, 
at the price of Rp 1.5 million; Multi-user with Local Area Network capability for medium sized 
BMT, at the price of Rp 3.5-10.0 million (depending on asset size); and an advanced version 
 28with on-line long distance network functionality (between head-office and branches) for large 
scale BMTs at the price of Rp20 million. 
PINBUK operates at the head office with a staff of 14 in Jakarata. Since 1999, PINBUK has 
been establishing chapters at the district level, so that primary BMT would belong to the 
district chapters. This has now been achieved in 250 out of 360 districts, each a one-man 
operation. Some 18% of the PINBUK district offices have a business development officer 
responsible for BMT development and monitoring, but many of these staff are involved also 
in other activities.  
PINBUK gets basic funding from YINDUK, which is funded from donations. Additional 
funding is received from the Ministry of Social Affairs, Ministry of Cooperatives, Ministry of 
Transmigration for special projects, eg, for establishing BMT in transmigration areas. The 
costs of training are covered from fees from the BMT. In some districts (approximately 5 out 
of 250), the BMT (approximatela 100) pay regular monthly contributions to the district office; 
this system is expected to be expanded. 
INKOPSYAH: Induk Koperasi Syariah is a parallel institution registered as a secondary-level 
cooperative since 1997, with a national office of 9 staff members in Jakarta. It functions as a 
wholesaler of funds from PNM and the  Small Enterprise Development Fund PUKK (which 
receives contributions from the 5% profit share state enterprises have to devote to poverty 
alleviation and small enterprise development) and monitors the loans, but leaves TA in the 
hands of PINBUK. INKOPSYAH has some 500 primary level BMT-members registered  with 
the MoC as cooperatives. To qualify as a member, total assets have to exceed Rp 500m. At 
the regional level, INKOPSYAH works through regional secondary cooperatives, Pusat 
Koperasi Kredit Syariah BMT (PUSKOP), which cooperate with PINBUK. The main function 
of the PUSKOP is to facilitate access of BMT to credit. They are also responsible for 
monitoring members and BMT that are non-members. As an example, the PUSKOP of 
Central Java employs 7 staff and funds its operations from fees from BMT for training and 
the sale of software; it also retains some margin on long-term loans (from the apex through 
PUSKOP to BMT), and from its ownership of five retail shops.  At the end of September 2002 
INKOPSYAH had total assets of Rp 2.6bn, with the major funding coming from PNM in the 
form of a 5 year subordinated loan of Rp 2bn  at 19% interest p.a. In 2003 INKOPSYAH was 
instrumental in channeling Rp 15bn from PNM to BMT. It reports a good repayment 
performance and a profit of Rp 300m in 2003. 
 
PNM: Permodalan Nasional Madani, is a commercially operating
6 state-owned corporation, 
acting as a wholesale apex for financing small and medium enterprise programs or projects 
of commercial banks, rural banks (BPR) and cooperatives. While Bank Indonesia’s functions 
have been concentrated on monetary policy, its various development banking functions have 
been divested in various other institutions, among them PNM as a replacement for BI’s 
Liquidity credit program, KLBI, since June 1999. In cooperation with ASBISINDO and 
PINBUK, PNM also supports Islamic financial institutions: commercial banks, rural banks and 
cooperatives.
7 The 85 BMT which are PNM borrowers are all registered with the MoC. The 
remaining 2500 are either dormant or weak. They require strengthening through (i) prudential 
regulation and effective supervision, which is the government’s task; capacity-building which 
is presently done by PINBUK but should be the task of associations of BMT; and (iii) financial 
development by wholesale institutions like PNM. In the absence of supervision, PNM, with a 
vested interest in quality, has taken steps to set up a supervision team; its functions and 
authority are being discussed with the MoC. In the future PNM plans to put more emphasis 
on human resource development of BMT in cooperation with PINBUK and ASBISINDO, thus 
                                                  
6 In 2003, total assets were Rp 1.96tr, equity was Rp 415bn, ROA 3.5%, ROE 16.3%. (PNM 2004:66-
69. 
7 PNM, as of Dec. 2003, had 652 microfinance customers: 432 BPR and BPRS (out of a total of 
reportedly 1200 healthy rural banks); 135 KSP/USP (out of a total of 2500 healthy cooperatives); and 
85 BMT (out of a total of 500 healthy Islamic cooperatives). 
 29providing both financial and social capital. It is hoped that PNM’s own quality management 
system
8 will eventually reflect on the BPRS and particularly BMT which it refinances. 
Bank linkages have been emerging, particularly with BMI and Bank Mandiri as well as with 
PNM as a wholesale apex. In 2002 Bank Mandiri allocated Rp 39.6 billion for on-lending to 
BMTs, provided through the Himbara Funds, taking 3% of its annual profit under the PUKK 
program. As of December 2002 the total amount disbursed through PINBUK at an interest 
rate of 6% p.a. was Rp 147 billion for 47,000 BMT members. The Bank has also conducted 
training for BMT staff. The major constraint for Bank Mandiri in assisting the BMTs is that 
most have no legal status and are not registered as cooperatives.  
Muamalat Institute: For strengthening Islamic commercial and rural banks, BMI has 
established the Muamalat Institute for Research, Training, Consulting & Publication. For 
banking with the poor organized in BMT and KOPONTREN, BMI has established Baitulmaal 
Muamalat, which focuses on channelling funds from the MoC to Islamic cooperatives. 
 
In addition to formal financing arrangements, BMTs receive substantial donations from 
wealthy Muslims. Management and supervision weaknesses are the major constraints for 
BMT, not funding. 
 
Microfin is an agency established in 2001 with the objective channelling funds to BMT and 
KOPONTREN and facilitating their evolution into MFIs (LKM) according to the draft 
microfinance law of 2001 or inducing them to establish BPRS. It is funded from the 
channelling fees of from government projects, executing profit margins from commercial 
banks and profit-sharing from individual investors. It has 10 staff members. Microfin has 
established a network of 109 BMT and participates in a program of channeling funds through 
7 projects to a total of 673 BMT and KOPONTREN, plus 24 BPRS (Dec. 2003).
9 Its future 
plans are to stimulate the establishment of additional BPRS, mainly by inducing groups of 5-
10  BMT to join together and establish BPRS, owned by larger numbers of shareholders.
10 
Another approach is for one large BMT to establish a BPRS for larger-scale commercial 
loans, while continuing as an unsupervised BMT for very small loans and social activities to 
the unbankable. 
 
Affiliations of sample BMT: BMT At-Taqwa has no network affiliations, but follows the 
PINBUK format of reporting. It has received soft loans from BMI and PNM. It is affiliated to 
two religious institutions: the Mosque At-Taqwa, its founding institution; and Badan Amil 
Zakat, a religious tax management institution which provides soft loans free of charge. BMT 
Ibaadurrahman is affiliated to BMM and BUMN  (Badan Usaha Milik Negara), two financial 
institutions from which it received financing of Rp 25m and Rp 33m, respectively, through the 
local cooperative authority. It is registered with PINBUK since 1998, but has received no 
services. It is attached to the local Pesantren. BMT Latenza is unaffiliated. BMT Wira Mandiri 
belongs to the PINBUK network and is an active participant.   
                                                  
8 ISO 9002-certified by TÜV. 
9 The first two are government projects, the next two projects with  commercial banks, the fifth is an 
NGO project, and the last two are projects with individual investors: 
o  P2KER, which has channeled Rp 47bn from MoC since 1997. Outstandings are Rp 12.8bn, 
overdues 55% (because these are government funds considered as grants)  
o  DBS, est. in 2003, with Rp 3bn outstandings invested in revolving funds; overdues are still 0% 
o  M3M established in 4/2004, with Rp 3bn outstandings 
o  LFM since 4/2004, with Rp 5.5bn outstandings 
o  IDF since 2000, with 0.2bn outstandings; overdues are 0%  
o  Deposito Mikro, (term deposits of Microfin), since 2000, amounting to Rp 100 million 
o  Invest Perorangan, since 2002, amounting to Rp 400 million; overdues are 0%. 
10 The establishment of BPRS Sahid by 19 BMT is reportedly in progress in Tulung Agung, East Java. 
A feasibility study is in process; Rp 500m have been collected; licensing is expected as of mid-2005.  
 306.   Summary, assessment and recommendations 
 
6.1  Summary and assessment 
 
(1) Financial sector framework  
Indonesia possesses one of the most differentiated microfinance infrastructures in the 
developing world, with a history of more than 100 years. In the increasingly liberal policy  
environment of the past two decades, two types of regulated microfinance institutions, 
belonging to the formal banking sector, have gained prominence on the microfinance market:  
•  the units of the Microbanking Division of government-owned BRI, since 1984,  
•  and the rural banks (BPR), since 1988.  
Together, they account for 95% of recorded deposits and 75% of loans outstanding among a 
total of 53,000 formal and semiformal microfinance institutions (MFIs). Financial 
cooperatives, which are unregulated semi-formal financial institutions, about 40,000 in 
number, account for another 5% of deposits and 18% of loans; they have suffered, rather 
than benefited, from preferential government treatment.  
 
Microfinance is no panacea; but it has certainly contributed to the reduction of poor from 60% 
in 1970 to 11.5% in 1996. The financial crisis of 1997/98 interrupted this trend; poverty rates 
surged, but then fell again below 20%. At the same time, the BRI units emerged 
strengthened, the rural banking sector restructured from the financial crisis, the latter 
responding positively to the enforcement of prudential regulation. The cooperative sector, 
much of it presumably in an undiagnosed state of ill health, continues to be effectively 
unregulated and unsupervised. A major challenge to the commercial banking sector including 
the BRI units is surplus liquidity and thus the development of more effective lending 
instruments; a parallel challenge among rural banks and financial cooperatives is liquidity 
shortage and thus either the development of more effective savings mobilization instruments 
or more effective mechanisms of liquidity exchange.  
 
Below are some of the highlights of the financial sector framework for Islamic banking 
and microfinance in Indonesia. 
 
A conducive policy environment for Islamic banking and microfinance in 
Indonesia: 
  A long history of banking and microfinance, dating back to 1895 
  A highly differentiated rural financial infrastructure 
  A deregulated policy and institutional framework since 1983 
  An appropriate commercial and microbanking legal framework  
  Favorable central bank regulation for Islamic banks 
  BRI units as the most successful microfinance network in the developing world, 
serving as benchmark institutions 
  Restructuring of the banking sector in response to the Asian financial crisis  
  Increasingly effective prudential regulation and bank supervision 
  A vast potential market for Islamic financial services in the largest Muslim country in 
the world 
  Key question: Is there an effective demand for Islamic financial services? 
 
Lack of a conducive sectoral framework for Islamic cooperatives: 
  Lack of prudential regulation of financial cooperatives 
  Lack of effective supervision of financial cooperatives 
  Market distortions resulting from access to subsidized sources of finance 
  Massive government interference in the cooperative sector in the past, but some 
incipient recent relaxation 
  Cooperative sector in an undiagnosed state of ill-health  
  Key question: Is there a chance for the development of sustainable Islamic 
cooperatives in Indonesia? 
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(2)  Principles and typology of Islamic finance  
Based on Islamic law, or sharia, Islamic finance is based on the ideal of a social order of 
brotherhood and solidarity and, more specifically, of a mutually beneficial partnership 
between depositor-investors, financial institutions with their staff and owners, and borrower-
investors, who all share risks and benefits in various ways. It finds its purest expression in 
mudarabah deposit products, based on revenue-sharing, which are pervasive among 
commercial and rural banks, and mudarabah financing facilities (conventionally: credit 
products), based on profit-sharing partnerships, but adopted on a limited scale only in 
Indonesia. Most of the financings are based on murabaha, a sales contract with a fixed profit 
margin to the bank. The overall emphasis is on financing profitable investments only, backed 
by collateral. Speculative and other morally hazardous financial transactions as well as most 
forms of consumer lending are prohibited.  
 
Islamic MFIs in Indonesia take it as their mandate to help the poor. Mistakenly, this has led 
many to believe that loans are akin to grants, or at least that leniency may be expected in 
meeting repayment obligations. In many cases, bank staff and borrowers had to learn the 
hard way that this is not so. Islamic MFIs do target the poor, but in actual fact only a segment 
of the poor: the enterprising poor.  Lending to the poorest who lack resources and 
entrepreneurial experience would be hazardous and speculative; it would thus be contrary to 
the notion of a partnership between borrowers and the providers of capital, ie, depositors and 
bank owners. There is yet another market segment served by them: that of the enterprising 
poorest who lack experience but show promise. For these, some institutions offer another 
financial product, albeit on a very small scale: qard (or qard hasan), repayable in regular 
instalments and frequently backed by personal guarantees like other financings, but without 
a profit-sharing margin. Even rarer than qard financings are qard savings in Indonesia, 
usually for religious or social purposes.  
 
Below are some of the distinguishing characteristics of Islamic finance in contrast to 
conventional banking and microfinance: 
 
Principles of Islamic banking – in contrast to conventional banking: 
  A social order based on cooperation, brotherhood and solidarity – in contrast to a 
social order based on competition which permits exploitation  
  Mutually beneficial partnerships between banks and clients, depositors and borrower-
investors – in contrast to diverging interests of the parties involved in transactions 
  Symmetrical information-sharing (as an ideal) – in contrast to asymmetrical 
information (assumed to be withheld by the borrower to cheat the bank) 
  Trust and confidence – in contrast to moral hazard as a constant threat in banking 
  Financing solid real transactions only – in contrast to high-risk speculative and 
hazardous transactions 
  Key concepts: Cooperation vs. competition; partnership vs. risky and exploitative 
relations 
 
Typology of Islamic financial products : 
  Mudaraba as a credit or deposit product based on mutually agreed upon variable 
ratios of profit or revenue sharing (difficult and costly to administer) – in contrast to 
fixed interest rates (transparent ex ante and simple to administer) 
  Murabahah as the main credit product, a triangular sales contract in which the bank 
pays the seller and finances the buyer at a fixed profit margin – in contrast to a direct 
loan to the client, also at a fixed interest rate (at lower administrative but higher risk 
costs) 
 32  Qard Hasan interest- or profit-free deposit products (rare in Indonesia
1) are the purest 
expression of the objection against interest-taking (riba) – non-existent in 
conventional banking 
  Qard Hasan interest- or profit-free credit products are a pure form of social banking, 
either for charitable purposes or for start-up entrepreneurs without business 
experience and collateral – there is no equivalent in conventional banking 
  Collateral as proof of a serious business relationship – in contrast to a safeguard in 
case of bankruptcy  
 
Mandate and target group of Islamic MFIs: 
  Helping the enterprising poor – in contrast to maximising profits from the most 
promising segments of the population 
 
Special risks in Islamic finance: 
  (Mis-) Interpreting brotherhood and partnership as leniency and loan forgiveness, 
resulting in loan delinquency (due to unwillingness to repay) – in contrast to seizing 
collateral in case of loan delinquency, resulting in bankruptcy (due to inability to 
repay). 
 
(3)  Beginnings of Islamic finance in Indonesia 
Islamic finance in Indonesia has evolved since 1991, mainly in response to political demands 
from Muslim scholars and organizations for sharia-based financial services, as a complement 
to conventional forms of finance in the largest Muslim country. The first Islamic rural banks 
were established in 1991, followed by the first Islamic commercial bank in 1992. In 1998, 
Bank Indonesia gave official recognition, as part of the new banking act, to the existence of a 
dual banking system, conventional and Islamic, or sharia-based. This led to the 
establishment of a second Islamic commercial bank and, until December 2003, of eight 
Islamic commercial banking units (out of a total of 138 commercial banks), comprising a total 
of 255 banking offices, with a continuing upward trend. The growth pattern of Islamic rural 
banks has been quite different. After an initial period of growth until 1996 when they reached 
a total of 71, their number almost stagnated during and after the financial crisis, reaching 78 
by 1998 and a mere 84 by 2003 (out of a total of 2134 rural banks).  The first Islamic 
cooperative was established in 1990. Rapid expansion started after 1996, as a result of 
promotion by PINBUK, and continued throughout the financial crisis, but stagnated after 
1999 at around 3000 and declined to less than 2,900 as of 2003 (out of a total of some 
40,000 financial cooperatives).  
 
Highlights of the evolution of Islamic finance in Indonesia include: 
 
Origin and recognition: 
  Due to initiatives in 1991 by Muslim scholars, not to popular demand  
  Official recognition of a dual banking system, conventional and Islamic, by Bank 
Indonesia in 1998 
 
Development: 
  Islamic commercial banks: continuing upward trend since 1992; 2 Islamic banks and 
8 Islamic banking units out of 138 commercial banks as of Dec. 2003 
  Islamic rural banks: Initial growth since 1991 until 1996 followed by stagnation;, 84 
out of a total of 2134 rural banks as of Dec. 2003 
  Islamic cooperatives: Start in 1990, rapid expansion after 1996, stagnation and 
decline since 1999; 2900 out of a total of 40,000 financial cooperatives as of Dec. 
2003. 
                                                  
1 By comparison, Qard Hasan (or Qard ol-Hassaneh) current and savings accounts are a major source 
of funds of banks in Iran. At the same time mudarabah or profit-sharing financings, which are of some 
importance in Indonesia, are virtually absent in Iranian banks. 
 33(4)  Islamic commercial banks in Indonesia 
Overview: Islamic commercial banks (including banking units)  account for 0.74% of total 
banking assets (2003); adding rural banks still yields the same percentage of 0.74%. This is 
a very small share; yet it is a big increase from a mere 0.17% in 2000. There is a remarkable 
difference in performance between conventional and Islamic commercial banks. In relative 
terms, (i) the Islamic banks lend more of the funds deposited, with a loans-to-deposits ratio 
(LDR, FDR) of 97% compared to 54% of the total commercial banking sector; and (ii) they 
lend them more successfully, with a gross non-performing loans ratio of 2.3% compared to 
8.2% of the total commercial banking sector. However, due to rapid expansion, the return on 
assets (ROA) of Islamic commercial banks is only 0.65%, compared to 2.12% of the 
commercial banking sector. 89% of the deposits in Islamic commercial banks and banking 
units are revenue-sharing deposits, with returns determined ex-post, which is non-existent in 
conventional banking. 20% of financings (or loans) are profit-sharing, 71.5% are fixed rate 
trade financings (murabahah), which are little different from conventional banking. 
 
Concluding assessment: The performance of the Islamic banks and banking units has 
motivated an increasing number of banks to announce the opening of Islamic banking units; 
continued growth of the Islamic commercial banking sector may be expected.  
 
Islamic vs. conventional commercial banks, Dec. 2003 
 Islamic    Conventional  Total 
Date of origin of first bank  1992  1895   
Total number of banks/banking units  10  136  138 + 8 units 
Total number of banking offices 





Total banking assets  0.74%  99.36%  100.0% 
Total loans outstanding  1.16%  88.84%  100.0% 
Total deposits  0.64%  99.36%  100.0% 
Loans-to-deposits ratio (LDR, FDR)  97%    54% 
Non-performing loans ratio (NPLR)  2.3%    8.2% 
Improvement in NPLR 2000-2003  13.0% to 2.3% 26.8% to 8.2%  
Return on assets  0.65%    2.12% 
 
 
Islamic vs. conventional commercial banks:  
  The share of Islamic commercial banks is a mere 0.74% of total banking assets 
  But they have grown fourfold over the past three years, and their non-performing 
assets are only a quarter of those of conventional banks: presumably due to their 
focus on prudent, non-speculative lending (perhaps also due to highly selective 
lending during their start-up phase) 
  They have benefited from a much-strengthened role of the central bank in prudential 
regulation and effective supervision and from enthusiasm for Islamic banking among 
established commercial banks 
  Islamic commercial banks may have a great potential in developing sustainable 
microfinance services of increasing volume and outreach, following the example of 
the microbanking units of Bank Rakyat Indonesia
2, a world leader in microfinance 
 
(5)  Islamic rural banks (BPRS) 
Overview: Islamic rural banks are part of the regulated and – at least during the last few 
years – effectively supervised rural banking sector, based on the rural banking law of 
October 1988 which defines rural banks as part of the formal banking sector, together with 
commercial banks. Islamic rural banks started to evolve only two years after conventional 
rural banks (BPR) came into existence, but at very different speeds: the number of 
                                                  
2 Note should be taken that BRI has recently established an Islamic banking unit, which so far has 
been kept apart from the its Microbanking Division. 
 34conventional BPR reached 2050 in December 2003, the number of Islamic BPRS 84 – in a 
predominantly Muslim country! While the number of conventional BPR grew at an average 
rate of 137 banks per year and the number of newly established BPR at a rate of 85.5 
(excluding those that were converted from previously existing institutions), the growth rate of 
BPRS was a mere 6.5 banks annually. BPRS account for a mere 1.5% of total assets, 1,5% 
of total loans outstanding and 1.2% of total deposits of the total regulated BPR sector. 
Moreover, BPRS are much smaller, with only 38% of the assets of an average BPR; and 
their asset growth rates, at 70% over a three-year period, are much lower than those of the 
BPR sector at 173%. There are no data to compare the performance of conventional and 
Islamic rural banks; information on NPL and ROA is not available. Both sub-sectors have 
experienced closures in recent years.  
 
Regional distribution: As of December 2003, there were 84 BPRS and 2050 conventional 
BPR. The majority of BPRS (62%) are located on Java, two-thirds of these in western Java. 
23% are on Sumatra and 8% on Sulawesi.  
 
Mandate, ownership, governance and supervision: Most BPRS are privately owned. They 
have a dual mandate, social and commercial, which may be one of the reasons of their slow 
growth. Conventional BPR, in contrast, are primarily oriented to profit-making, though their 
owners may also feel some commitment to the local community. Islamic rural banks cater for 
the enterprising poor in the informal sector, leaving out the more profitable sectors of salary 
earners and small entrepreneurs on the one hand and the poorest on the other hand. The 
percentage of clients below the poverty line in four sample BPRS was estimated at 6%. The 
owners of BPRS are mostly absentee-owners and rarely involved in the management of the 
bank. In contrast, owners of conventional BPR are frequently owner-managers. Each BPRS 
has a sharia board, a management board and a supervisory board, each with its own 
problems: there is no historical experience with Islamic banking in Indonesia; many of the 
managers are retired government bankers who lack the drive of a private banker; the 
controllers are usually far and remote. Banking supervision is effectively carried out by Bank 
Indonesia, which has closed four out of 90 BPRS ever licensed between 1991 and June 
2004. 
 
Delivery system: The four sample BPRS have on average two branches and 21 staff 
members, half of them loan officers including collectors with door-step services. Incentives 
are limited to an annual bonus which is not tied to individual performance. In line with the 
mudarabah principle, some BPRS are discussing the introduction of profit-sharing between 
staff and owners as a substitute for a fixed salary.  
 
Market and outreach: There are no statistics on the outreach of BPRS. Total depositor 
outreach of the BPRS sector may be estimated at 83,000, or less than 1000 per bank; total 
borrower outreach at around 30,000, or 350 per BPRS. 84% of the clients in five sample 
BPRS were small (itinerant) traders and microentrepreneurs; around 25% were women. 
Virtually all clients have an existing business. The very poor are expected to seek 
employment in a larger enterprise, which might be financed by an Islamic commercial bank. 
 
Total assets and sources of funds: The average BPRS as of Dec. 2003 has total assets of 
US$ 270,000; the average conventional BPR is almost three times larger. Deposits are the 
main source of funds (57% of total assets) in BPRS, followed by equity including reserves 
and current year profits (23%), bank deposits (11.5%) and borrowings (4%). The loans-to-
deposits ratio in all BPRS is 126%, compared to 103% in the total BPR sector. 
 
Financial services: Revenues (not profits!) of withdrawable savings deposits are shared in 
the five sample BPRS between clients and banks. The ratios of revenue-sharing vary widely 
between institutions and clients; the average ratio is 40:60, resulting in an average return of 
8.3% during 2003; revenues of fixed deposits are shared at 60:50 on average, with an 
effective return of 13%. Most of the financings are based on murabaha (86% of financings in 
 35five sample BPRS, unweighted average): a sales contract with a fixed margin, which is better 
understood by the borrowers and easier to handle for the bank than . As common in 
Indonesia, instalments are monthly or weekly (sometimes daily). The mark-ups are mostly 
flat rates, averaging 55% effective p.a. among the five sample banks, which is probably close 
to the average lending rate of BPR in Indonesia; only the BRI units are lower (averaging 
~35% eff. p.a.). Coompared to BMI, the first Islamic commercial bank in Indonesia, BPRS 
pay slightly more on deposits, but charge 3-4 times as much on financings. 
 
Economic performance: No data are available on the performance of the BPRS sector as 
whole. Their emphasis on financing only profitable activities should give them a comparative 
advantage, their much smaller size, governance problems and market restrictions a 
disadvantage. In four sample BPRS, which are far bigger than the average BPRS, the 
average non-performing loan ratio was 4.6%, the average ROA 3.2%, compared to an NPL 
of 2.5% and a ROA of 5.7% in the benchmark BRI units.  
 
Affiliations and support: Asosiasi Bank Syariah Indonesia (ASBISINDO) was established in 
1992 as an association of Islamic rural banks; since 2002 its coverage also includes Islamic 
commercial banks. The two Islamic commercial banks, 7 out of 9 Syaria units of commercial 
banks and 82 BPRS are members of Asbisindo. Its main activity is the training of 
management and staff of Islamic commercial banks and rural banks.  PNM, a government 
corporation which has replaced Bank Indonesia’s small credit department, refinances BPR 
and BPRS and other conventional and Islamic financial institutions and supports their 
capacity development.  
 
Concluding assessment: After 13 years of development of Islamic rural banks and 15 years 
of development of a regulated rural banking sector in Indonesia, Islamic rural banks still 
constitute a minute part of the rural banking sector as well as of the total Islamic 
banking sector, with no prospects of growth: 
 
  4% of the total number of rural banks (BPR/S)  
  1.5% of total assets the rural banking sector
3 
  0.02% of the total banking sector 
  2.4% of the total Islamic commercial and rural banking sector assets 
  1.5% of total loans outstanding of the rural banking sector 
  1.2% of total deposits of the rural banking sector. 
 
Total outreach of Islamic rural banks amounts to 83,000 deposit accounts and 30,000 credit 
accounts, totalling 113,000 accounts held by perhaps 82,000 people; this is:  
 
  1.5% of the outreach of the total rural banking sector and  
  0.14% of the total microfinance sector. 
                                                  
3 Rural banks account for 1.2% of total assets of the banking sector. 
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Islamic vs. conventional rural banks, Dec. 2003 
 Islamic    Conventional
4   Total 
Date of origin of first rural bank (BPR/S)  1991  1989   
Total number of BPR/S as of Dec. 2003 







Number of newly established BPR/S as 







Av. number of BPR/S p.a. since origin  6.5  136.7   
Total rural banking assets  1.5%  98.5%  100% 
Size of BPRS in % of average BPR  38%     
Asset growth during 2000-2003  70%  175%  173% 
Total loans outstanding  1.5%  98.5%  100.0% 
Total deposits  1.2%  98.8%  100.0% 
Loans-to-deposits ratio (LDR, FDR)  126%  103%  103% 
Non-performing loans ratio (NPLR)  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
Return on assets  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
Total outreach: 
  Rural banking sector 











Islamic vs. conventional rural banks: 
  Regulated Islamic and conventional rural banks have evolved over almost the same 
time period, 13 and 15 years, respectively 
  Islamic rural banks have remained small. The volume of their services is negligible, 
compared to conventional rural banks, accounting for only 4% in number, 1.5% in 
assets as well as outreach, and 1.2% of deposits 
  Their growth in numbers has stagnated in recent years; and their growth in assets 
has remained far behind that of conventional rural banks 
  Lack of popular demand for Islamic banking services, absentee ownership, lack of 
young dynamic management, lack of mastery of overly complex Islamic banking 
practices, and emphasis on the informal sector and the poor to the neglect of more 
profitable market segments are among the many reasons for their retarded 
development  
 
(6)  Islamic cooperatives (BMT)  
Overview: Islamic cooperatives suffer from the same benign regulatory neglect as 
conventional cooperatives. There is no overall supervision and no systematic recording of 
either conventional or Islamic cooperatives (BMT); most BMT (83% according to a BI 
estimate) are not even registered with the Ministry of Cooperatives. After a period of rapid 
growth after 1995 when PINBUK assumed their promotion, they are now in decline; the 
majority of the 3000 BMT now are assumed to be dormant or technically bankrupt. PINBUK 
has no power to enforce reporting, much less so prudential regulation; the Ministry has the 
power, but does not use it, and may in fact be an inappropriate organization to do so. All 
general information provided in this report on cooperatives is therefore of questionable 
validity. In recent years, efforts have been made to improve the quality of cooperatives, 
reportedly with initial success in some areas like Central Java. 
 
There are around 2900 Islamic cooperatives (BMT), constituting 7.2% of all financial 
cooperatives, 2.9% of their deposits and 1.1% of loans outstanding. Borrower outreach is 
                                                  
4 The law (PAKTO27) authorizing the establishment of rural banks (BPR)  was passed in October 
1988; the first regulated BPR were established in 1989; but the first predecessor institution, the Rural 
Bank of Purwokerto, was established as early as 1895.  By June 2002, 1365, or 62% out of a total of 
2213 BPR had been newly established, 1283 of them conventional  – a figure which is still fifteen 
times larger than the number of BPRS. 
 37reported as 73,000 accounts
5, which is less than 1% of total borrower outreach of the 
financial cooperative sector. There is no information on the number of deposit accounts.  
 
Regional distribution: The majority of the 2900 BMT (60% in 2003), like BPRS, are located 
on Java, but are spread far more equally over western, central and eastern Java. 20% are on 
Sumatra, 12% on Sulawesi. BMT are underrepresented on Kalimantan and the smaller 
islands. 
 
Mission, legal status, governance and supervision:  
The BMT in our sample see it as their mission to help the enterprising poor, particularly very 
small microentrepreneurs including food vendors (kaki-lima). Only an estimated 500 out of 
3000 BMT are registered as financial cooperatives with the Ministry of Cooperatives. It is not 
expected that the draft microfinance law of 2001, which might have provided a legal 
framework, will be enacted within the foreseeable future. As cooperatives, BMT are owned 
by their members; but there is frequently a distinction between a small number of voting 
members, who are share-holders, and  associated members. Board size and composition 
are not standardized, but on principle similar to that of BPRS. Only about 50% report to their 
local PINBUK. INKOPSYAH receives monthly reports from its members as a prerequisite of 
access to sources of refinancing. PINBUK has no formal supervisory powers; a supervision 
project was short-lived as funds ran out. Officials from the Ministry of Cooperatives rarely go 
beyond attending annual meetings when invited. There is no external auditing. In general, 
supervisory arrangements, enforcement of standards, information and reporting are either 
absent or ineffective. 
 
Delivery system: In the four sample BMT, the average number staff is close to four, half of 
them loan officers or collectors. The average service radius is about 14 km. BMT normally do 
not have branches.  
 
Market and outreach: The majority of BMT clients are small and itinerant traders and other 
microentrepreneurs. There is no reliable information on outreach. We estimate total saver 
and borrower outreach at around 1.7million, but probably only about one-third of them active.  
 
Total assets and sources of funds: The median asset size per BMT is estimated by PINBUK 
at Rp 250 million (US$ 24,000) as of 2001. 2% were listed with asset sizes above Rp 1 
billion, 9.5% with asset sizes below 50 million. Deposits are the main source of funds, 
followed by capital. In contrast to conventional cooperatives, borrowings in BMT seem to be 
of minor importance; the mean loan portfolio is almost matched by deposits (LDR = 103%).  
 
Financial services: The question about the difference between Islamic and comparable non-
Islamic institutions evoked little response. Deposit products are mainly based on mudarabah, 
ie, revenue-sharing between clients and BMT: The average ratio in the four sample BMT for 
savings accounts is 34:66, average annual returns are 8.8%; the respective values for term 
deposits are 42:58 and 13.6% - insignificantly higher than in the sample BPRS.  
 
The average number of loan accounts in the four sample BMT, which are far above the 
national average in size, is 327. Loan sizes are less than half the volume of those in the 
sample BPRS. In the sample BMT, 61.5% of financings are murabahah, ie, a sales contract 
between bank and client – less than in the BPRS. Mudarabah, based on profit-sharing, with a 
share of 32%, and qard al-hassan, a free loan product for poor start-ups with a share of 
3.5%, are relatively more important. Requiring collateral is standard. In some cases thre are 
compulsory savings around 5%. Effective annual mark-ups, or profit margins to the bank, are 
around 50%. It is common not to charge penalties on late payments. Given a sample size of 
4 out of 2900, all these figures may not even be indicative. 
 
                                                  
5 The validity of this figures is questionable. 
 38Economic performance: In the absence of effective regulation and supervision, the 
performance of BMT is very uneven; information is sporadic.  A large number of BMT may be 
dormant, and members inactive. PNM  has identified 500 BMT, which are members of 
INKOPSYAH and registered with the MoC, as worth strengthening; this is less than one-fifth 
of the total number. In the four sample BMT, NPF ratios vary widely, from 1.4% to 30%, but 
are mostly estimates. All four BMT in our sample show positive returns on year-end assets, 
with ROAs ranging from 0.16% to 2.7%; but these figures are not reliable as sizeable bad 
debts may not have been written off. In three regional studies of MFIs by the ADB team 
(2003), the BRI units came out first as sustainable institutions with wide outreach and 
excellent performance; in two of these, the BMTs came out as complete failures, while in the 
third the BMT, after restructuring and after considerable capital injections, showed promise. 
BPRS were not found in the sample.  
 
Affiliations and support: The most important promoter of Islamic cooperatives is PINBUK, the 
Centre for Micro Enterprise Incubation, established in 1995 by YINBUK, a foundation, as its 
operational arm. It provides a MIS to BMT and, through regional offices, basic, intermediate 
and advanced training, plus training of trainers. While PINBUK provides technical assistance, 
INDOPSYAH, a commercially operating secondary-level cooperative, functions as a 
wholesaler of funds from PNM and other sources. Microfin has established a network of 109 
BMTand channels project  funds to a total of 673 BMT and KOPONTREN, plus 24 BPRS; it 
also tries to promote their institutional upgrading to MFIs (LKM) or BPRS. PNM, which has 
replaced BI’s liquidity credit operations, has provided liquidity to 85 BMT. To step up its 
outreach and effectiveness, it will cooperate with PINBUK and ASBISINDO  to provide 
supervision and on human resource development services, thus strengthening both the 
financial and social capital of BMT. Additional financial resources are provided by Islamic 
banks. BMI, the first Islamic bank, channels funds through Baitulmaal Muamalat and 
technical assistance through the Muamalat Institute for Research, Training, Consulting & 
Publication. BMTs also receive donations from wealth Muslims. The main constraints for 
BMT are management and supervision weaknesses, not funding. 
 
Concluding assessment: The outreach of Islamic cooperatives is negligible, their overall 
performance poor; for several years they have been in decline: 
 
  There is a complete lack of regulation, supervision and reliable reporting 
  The large majority of them is reported to be dormant or technically bankrupt 
  Their outreach is negligible, accounting for 7.2% of all financial cooperatives, but less 
than 1% of borrower outreach of the sector 
  Their loan portfolio (much of it overdue) accounts for 1,1% of the financial cooperative 
sector and 0.19% of the microfinance sector 
  The savings of the depositors are at great risk. 
 
Islamic vs. conventional cooperatives 
 Islamic    Conventional
6   Total 
Total number of financial cooperatives* 







Total  assets  n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Total loans outstanding  1.1%  98.9%  100.0% 
Total deposits  2.9%  97.1  100.0% 
Loans-to-deposits ratio (LDR, FDR)  90%  34%  35% 
Non-performing loans ratio (NPLR)  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
                                                  
6 The law (PAKTO27) authorizing the establishment of rural banks (BPR)  was passed in October 
1988; the first regulated BPR were established in 1989; but the first predecessor institution, the Rural 
Bank of Purwokerto, was established as early as 1895.  By June 2002, 1365, or 62% out of a total of 
2213 BPR had been newly established, 1283 of them conventional  – a figure which is still fifteen 
times larger than the number of BPRS. 
 39Return on assets  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
Total outreach: credit accounts**  0.7%  99.3%  100.0 
* Source: Table 1.1, preliminary figures; there are no authoritative data on the cooperative sector. 
** There is no information on the number of deposit accounts in BMT. 
 
Islamic vs. conventional financial cooperatives: 
  The whole cooperative sector has historically suffered from a complete lack of 
regulation and supervision, paralleled by excessive government interference and 
subsidies which have distorted rural financial markets and undermined self-help  
  The majority of Islamic cooperatives are reportedly dormant or technically bankrupt 
  Outreach and volume of services of Islamic cooperatives are negligible compared to 
conventional cooperatives, which are also in a state of acute but undiagnosed ill-
health 
  The savings of depositors are at great risk; cooperatives should not be authorized to 
accept savings of non-members 
  No remedy is in sight. 
 
 
(7) Conclusion   
Islamic finance, after 13 years, accounts for 0.74%
7 of total assets of the banking sector: a 
negligible proportion. However, since Bank Indonesia gave official recognition to a dual 
banking system, conventional and Islamic, enthusiasm for Islamic finance spread among 
commercial banks, fuelled by low rates of non-performing loans, and the share of Islamic 
commercial banks more than quadrupled during the last three years, 2001-2003: from 0.17% 
to 0.74%.  
 
Islamic rural banks (BPRS), providers of microfinance services, are under the same 
effective prudential regulation and supervision as commercial banks and conventional rural 
banks (BPR). After a promising start in the early 1990s, their development has almost come 
to a standstill. Despite the fact that they had only two years less than conventional BPR, 
which started to evolve after the rural banking act of 1988, and despite the special services 
provided by the Islamic Banking Directorate of Bank Indonesia, they have attained a mere 
4% of the number and 1.5% of the assets of the rural banking sector; and their growth in 
recent years has been much slower than that of the conventional rural banks: 
  The number of BPRS grew by 6.5, conventional BPR by 137 banks p.a. 
  Average assets of BPRS amount to only 38% of the assets of conventional BPR. 
  During 2001-2003, total assets of the BPRS grew by 70%, the BPR sector by 173%. 
 
Islamic financial cooperatives suffer from the same regulatory and supervisory neglect as 
the rest of the sector. After a period of rapid growth during most of the 1990s, they are now in 
decline, with perhaps not more than one-fifth expanding and in good health. Fresh money 
pumped into the BMT sector without effective regulation and supervision including mandatory 
auditing will further contribute to their downfall, as has been the case in the state-supported 
KSP/USP sector.  
 
                                                  
7 The percentage remains the same when including the assets of Islamic rural banks and those of 




Options: On the factual basis of thirteen years of experience with Islamic banking in 
Indonesia, decision-makers now are confronted with two major options: 
 
(1) Focusing fully on the Islamic commercial banks in Indonesia and assisting them to 
establish branch networks of Islamic microfinance institutions 
 
(2) Re-assessing in a participatory process the challenges and realistic opportunities of 
Islamic rural banks and cooperatives, taking into consideration the lack of broad 
popular demand, be it from poor or non-poor, and the lack of dynamic growth. 
 
Risks and constraints: It is beyond the scope of this preliminary study to submit a definitive 
recommendation as to option 1 or 2.  However, policymakers should be aware that the 
Islamic commercial banks are on the right track of becoming a healthy and rapidly growing 
sub-sector of the commercial banking sector; that potential could be further utilized to give 
them a stronger role in microfinance. Examining their strengths and weaknesses was not 
part of this study; but there was sufficient evidence to arrive at the conclusion that they 
already stand on their own feet and are in the process of rapid development, both in 
quantitative and qualitative terms. Islamic banking, with its variable and flexible ratios of 
revenue-sharing with depositors and profit-sharing with borrowers is unduly complicated. 
Only commercial banks appear to be able of acquiring the art of Islamic banking by training 
young and dynamic people. 
 
The same cannot be said of the Islamic rural banks and the Islamic cooperatives: the former 
– in contrast to conventional BPR – have failed to prove themselves as effective and efficient 
providers of microfinance services; the latter are an outright menace to their shareholders 
and depositors, who are at great risk to loose their money. In most BPRS, the retired 
conventional bankers (experienced bankers must be hired according to BI regulation) find it 
difficult to learn and apply the art of Islamic banking; and their sharia boards are frequently 
not more experienced. 
 
Opportunities: We recommend to decision-makers in Islamic organizations, government 
agencies and donor organizations to critically examine the following opportunities for the 
development of a healthy Islamic financial sector in Indonesia: 
 
  Islamic commercial banks, in setting up branch networks of Islamic MFIs, may learn 
with good prospects from the rich experience of successful microfinance strategies 
and institutions within Indonesia, in particular:  
 
(1) from the experience of the units of the Bank Rakyat Indonesia Microbanking 
Division, one of the most successful microfinance programs in the developing 
world; and  
(2) from Bank Indonesia’s program Linking Banks and Self-Help Groups, a financial 
technology of extending the outreach of banks to low-income people at 
reasonable transaction costs 
 
  Islamic rural banks need to be revamped if they are to play a more than marginal 
role in Indonesia. This requires an overall development plan for the BPRS sector 
mutually agreed upon by all stakeholders. With some reservation, due to poor 
prospects if there is anything to be learned from past history, we recommend to the 
stakeholders the following: 
 
(1) Establishing a strong banking association to provide a full range of support 
services to their members on a cost-covering basis; a much-strengthened 
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(ProFI), may promote such an association
8 or provide those services ad interim  
(2) Selecting some of the most successful Islamic rural banks as demonstration and 
exposure learning sites, to provide apprenticeship and extended exposure training 
to staff and future managers 
(3) A farther-reaching option would be a dual training system to prepare young 
dynamic graduates for management positions (instead of relying on elderly retired 
bankers) 
(4) Developing more effective savings products and strategies as a substitute for 
borrowings  
(5) Mandatory auditing should be extended to all BPRS, regardless of size 
(6) Bank Indonesia should be encouraged to continue providing guidance, enforcing 
prudential rules and closing defunct BPRS. 
(7) For the rapid expansion of the BPRS network, absentee owners may be 
interested in a Build-Transfer-Operate approach, perhaps as part of a franchising 
model, with profit-sharing between the franchiser and the franchisee. 
 
  Islamic cooperatives suffer from much the same set of problems as the whole 
cooperative sector; there is little chance for any intervention to be successful in the 
short run:  
 
(1) They most urgently need a system of prudential regulation, mandatory auditing, 
and effective supervision by an appropriate financial authority (perhaps delegated 
to an autonomous auditing federation, but definitely not in the hands of a ministry).  
(2) They should be fully financed through member equity and savings deposits of 
members; only healthy and well supervised cooperatives should be permitted to 
collect deposits from non-members.  
(3) They should develop more effective savings products and strategies as a 
substitute for borrowings 
(4) The services of organizations whose sole purpose is channelling of project funds 
should be phased out.  
(5) Like Islamic rural banks, Islamic cooperatives need strong associations and 
federations to provide a full range of support services to their members on a cost-
covering basis; a much-strengthened PINBUK is one of the organizations that 
may promote such associations or provide those services ad interim 
(6) Associations and federations may be strengthened to the point where they may 
replace a governmental agency like the Ministry of Cooperatives, which, in the 
framework of massive government interference by the previous political system, 
seems to have been more detrimental than constructive in building self-reliant and 
healthy cooperatives 
(7) Some of the most successful Islamic cooperatives may be selected as 
demonstration and exposure learning sites: providing  apprenticeship and 
extended exposure training to staff and future managers. 
 
 
                                                  
8 The structure and functioning of bank associations in developed countries, like the associations of 
cooperative banks (DRGV) and savings banks (DSGV) in Germany, may serve as examples and 
perhaps partners in development.  
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Of all areas devastated by the Tsunami of 26 December 2004, the province of Aceh has 
been hardest hit. Providing relief and reconstructing the livelihoods of the surviving victims is 
the immediate task; reconstructing the physical and institutional infrastructure will have to 
come next. If the efforts at reconstruction are to lead to sustainable development, rural and 
microfinance will have an important role to play. 
 
For political reasons, Aceh has been isolated in the past from mainstream development. The 
challenge is thus not just reconstructing, but laying the foundations for a sound system of 
rural and microfinance institutions. All those impoverished by the floods, as well as 
everybody else, need access to sustainable financial institutions for depositing savings 
including relief benefits and obtaining credit. As I have shown elsewhere (Seibel 2003a), 
relief benefits are likely to be wasted, or limited in their effectiveness, if victims have no 
access to financial services. 
 
The people of Aceh adhere strongly to the principles of Islam, including those of Islamic 
finance; taking or charging interest (riba) is against their religious conviction. Despite its 
isolation, Aceh has 5 Islamic rural banks, established during 1991-95, and 76 Islamic 
cooperatives, of which less than 20 are reportedly functioning. This is a beginning, but not an 
adequate structure of Islamic finance. Building strong Islamic financial institutions in Aceh 
could be of enormous benefit to the reconstruction and development of the province. 
Thereby Aceh could become the province benefiting most from the results of this study on 
the positive and negative experience of Islamic finance in Indonesia.  
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       Annex 1 :     
BALANCE SHEET & INCOME STATEMENT OF BPRS, 2003 
 
            
Jumlah Jumlah  TOTAL  NERACA 
No ITEMS 
 Jabotabek   Wil. KBI  NASIONAL 
1 Kas             1.218.686          2.438.758          3.657.444  
2  Sertifikat Bank Indonesia                    -                     -                     -  
3 Antarbank  Aktiva          9.128.753        22.760.482          31.889.235  
4  Kredit  Yang Diberikan        50.453.310         88.107.877        138.561.187  
5 Penyisihan Aktiva Produktif (-/-)         (1.189.702)         (3.270.066)         (4.459.768) 
6  Aktiva Dalam Valuta Asing                    -                     -                     -  
7 Aktiva  Tetap dan Inventaris          2.045.709          6.825.872          8.871.581  
   a.  Tanah dan Gedung            811.433           2.968.067          3.779.500  
   b.  Akumulasi Penyusutan Gedung (-/-)             (40.961)          (203.929)            (244.890) 
   c.  Inventaris          2.567.268          6.933.812          9.501.080  
   d.  Akumulasi Penyusutan Inventaris (-/-)         (1.292.031)         (2.872.078)         (4.164.109) 
8 Antarkantor  Aktiva                    -                     -                     -  
9 Rupa-rupa Aktiva          2.239.035        10.991.650          13.230.685  
                    
   Jumlah Aktiva        63.895.791        127.854.573        191.750.364  
                    
1 Kewajiban yg. Segera Dibayar            397.434           1.293.485          1.690.919  
2 Tabungan        17.638.210         40.935.885          58.574.095  
3 Deposito Berjangka        22.093.054         29.331.737          51.424.791  
4 Bank  Indonesia            650.000             517.900           1.167.900  
5 Antarbank  Pasiva          8.564.800        12.350.535          20.915.335  
6 Pinjaman Diterima          1.339.206          5.898.703          7.237.909  
   a.  Pinjaman Subordinasi               3.100                     -                3.100  
   b.  Lainnya          1.336.106          5.898.703          7.234.809  
      ii Sampai Dengan 3 Bulan            227.222                     -             227.222  
      ii  Lebih Dari 3 Bulan          1.108.884          5.898.703          7.007.587  
7 Antarkantor  Pasiva                    -                     -                     -  
8 Rupa-rupa Pasiva            909.029           5.844.904          6.753.933  
9 Modal        11.539.936         26.050.883          37.590.819  
   a.  Modal Dasar        13.213.000         38.237.000          51.450.000  
   b.  Modal yg. Blm. Disetor (-/-)         (4.595.760)        (15.849.900)       (20.445.660) 
   c.  Modal Sumbangan            851.188             292.601           1.143.789  
   d.  Modal Pinjaman          2.071.508          3.371.182          5.442.690  
10 Cadangan            816.678           2.898.292          3.714.970  
   a.  Cadangan Umum            563.346           1.527.447          2.090.793  
   b.  Cadangan Tujuan            177.196             710.563             887.759  
   c.  Laba Yang Ditahan             76.136             660.282             736.418  
11 Laba/Rugi             (52.556)         2.732.249          2.679.693  
   a.  Tahun Lalu           (453.972)          1.889.516          1.435.544  
      ii  Laba Tahun Lalu          1.593.485          4.457.001          6.050.486  
      ii  Rugi Tahun Lalu (-/-)         (2.047.457)         (2.567.485)         (4.614.942) 
   b.  Tahun Berjalan            401.416             842.733           1.244.149  
      ii  Laba Tahun Berjalan            493.226           1.047.077          1.540.303  
      ii  Rugi Tahun berjalan (-/-)             (91.810)          (204.344)            (296.154) 
                    
   Jumlah Pasiva        63.895.791        127.854.573        191.750.364  
            
     Modal              12.304.058               31.681.424              43.985.482  
     aktiva  produktif              50.453.310              88.107.877              138.561.187  
       24,39%  35,96%  31,74% 
      ROA (current year)  0,63%  0,66%  0,65% 
      ROE (current year)  3,48%  3,23%  3,31% 
     PPAP/AP  2,36%  3,71%  3,22%  
Annex 4:   LIST OF BPRS (JUNE 2004)         




Kab/Kotamadya/City  Propinsi/Province 
1  PT (Ltd.)  Ibadurrahman   Sep 93  Okt 93 Penajam Paser Utama  Kalimantan Timur 
2  PT (Ltd.)  Hareukat  Okt 91  Nov 91 Aceh Besar  Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam 
3  PT (Ltd.)  Baiturrahman  Mrz 94  Apr 94 Aceh Besar  Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam 
4  PT (Ltd.)  Tengku Chiek Dipante  Mrz 94  Apr 94 Pidie  Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam 
5  PT (Ltd.)  Hikmah Wakilah  Jul 95  Jul 95 Banda Aceh  Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam 
6  PT (Ltd.)  Sakai Sambayan  Jan 96  Feb 96 Lampung Selatan  Lampung 
7  PT (Ltd.)  Daya Murni Sejahtera  Mrz 97  Apr 97 Tulang Bawang  Lampung 
8  PT (Ltd.)  Berkah Amal Sejahtera  Jul 91  Jul 91 Bandung Jawa  Barat 
9  PT (Ltd.)  Dana Mardhatilla  Jul 91  Jul 91 Bandung Jawa  Barat 
10  PT (Ltd.)  Amanah Rabbaniah  Sep 91  Okt 91 Bandung Jawa  Barat 
11  PT (Ltd.)  Mentari   Jan 93  Feb 93 Garut Jawa  Barat 
12  PT (Ltd.)  Baitur Ridha  Jun 93  Sep 93 Bandung Jawa  Barat 
13  PT (Ltd.)  Babusaalam  Nov 93  Nov 93 Bandung Jawa  Barat 
14  PT (Ltd.)  Dana Tijarah  Dez 93  Jan 94 Cimahi Jawa  Barat 
15  PT (Ltd.)  Mukarramah  Mrz 94  Mrz 94 Bandung Jawa  Barat 
16  PT (Ltd.)  Al Ma'soem Syari'ah  Mai 94  Jul 94 Bandung Jawa  Barat 
17  PT (Ltd.)  Harum Hikmah Nugraha   Jun 94  Jul 94 Garut Jawa  Barat 
18  PT (Ltd.)  Artha Sakinah  Aug 94  Aug 94 Cianjur   Jawa Barat 
19  PT (Ltd.)  Ishlalul Ummah  Sep 94  Feb 94 Cimahi Jawa  Barat 
20  PT (Ltd.)  Artha Fisabilillah  Apr 95  Jun 95 Cianjur   Jawa Barat 
21  PT (Ltd.)  Tolong Menolong 
Bermanfaat (To'at) 
Baleendah 
Jan 96  Mrz 96 Bandung Jawa  Barat 
22  Koperasi 
(Cooperation) 
Al Ihsan  Mai 95  Jun 95 Bandung Jawa  Barat 
23  PT (Ltd.)  Berkah Gemadana  Sep 93  Okt 95 Banjar Kalimantan  Selatan 
24  PT (Ltd.)  Muamalat Harkat  Jan 96  Jan 96 Bengkulu Selatan  Bengkulu 
25  PT (Ltd.)  Syarif Hidayatullah  Feb 94  Mrz 94 Cirebon   Jawa Barat 
26  PT (Ltd.)  Syariat Fajar Sejahtera 
Bali 
Apr 94  Mai 94 Badung Bali 
27  PT (Ltd.)  Muamalat Yofeta  Feb 98  Mrz 98 Jayapura Papua 
28  PT (Ltd.)  Artha Sinar Mentari  Jul 94  Sep 94 Jember Jawa  Timur 
29  PT (Ltd.)  Amanah Ummah  Jul 92  Jul 92 Bogor Jawa  Barat 
30  PT (Ltd.)  Artha Karimah Irsyadi  Okt 92  Nov 92 Bekasi   Jawa Barat 
31  PT (Ltd.)  Bina Amwalul Hasanah   Dez 92  Feb 93 Depok Jawa  Barat 
32  PT (Ltd.)  Inti Raqqat  Dez 92  Dez 92 Tangerang Banten 
33  PT (Ltd.)  Harta Insan Karimah  Aug 93  Sep 93 Tangerang Banten 
34  PT (Ltd.)  Baituniaga Insani  Okt 93  Okt 93 Bekasi Jawa  Barat 
35  PT (Ltd.)  Saleh Artha  Dez 93  Jan 94 Bekasi Jawa  Barat 
36  PT (Ltd.)  Tijari Baitul Maal  Apr 02  Apr 02 Tangerang Banten 
37  PT (Ltd.)  Baitul Muawanah  Aug 94  Sep 94 Cilegon Banten 
38  PT (Ltd.)  Attaqwa Garuda Utama  Okt 94  Okt 94 Tangerang Banten 
39  PT (Ltd.)  Wakalumi  Jan 95  Apr 95 Tangerang Banten 
40  PT (Ltd.)  Darma Amanah  Mai 95  Jun 95 Lebak Banten 
41  PT (Ltd.)  Al Barokah  Jan 96  Mrz 96 Depok Jawa  Barat 
42  PT (Ltd.)  Risalah Ummat  Mrz 96  Mai 96 Tangerang Banten 
43  PT (Ltd.)  Bina Rahmah  Sep 96  Okt 96 Bogor Jawa  Barat 
44  PT (Ltd.)  Insani  Okt 96  Okt 96 Tangerang Banten 
45  PT (Ltd.)  Ariyah Jaya  Okt 96  Okt 96 Depok Jawa  Barat 
 4746  PT (Ltd.)  Amanah Insani  Okt 97  Okt 97 Bekasi Jawa  Barat 
47  PT (Ltd.)  Rif’atul Ummah  Feb 98  Mai 98 Bogor Jawa  Barat 
48  PT (Ltd.)  Insan Cita Artha Jaya  Feb 98  Feb 98 Bogor Jawa  Barat 
49  PT (Ltd.)  Berkah Ramadhan  Mrz 02  Apr 02 Tangerang Banten 
50  PT (Ltd.)  Al Mabrur Babadan  Nov 00  Jan 01 Ponorogo Jawa  Timur 
51  PT (Ltd.)  Rahman Hijrah Agung  Dez 95  Dez 95 Aceh Utara  Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam 
52  PT (Ltd.)  Bhakti Haji Malang  Dez 95  Mrz 96 Malang Jawa  Timur 
53  PT (Ltd.)  Daya Artha Mentari  Mrz 96  Mrz 96 Pasuruan Jawa  Timur 
54  PT (Ltd.)  Al Hidayah  Mai 99  Jun 99 Pasuruan Jawa  Timur 
55  Koperasi 
(Cooperation) 
Untung Surapati  Aug 01  Sep 01 Pasuruan Jawa  Timur 
56  PT (Ltd.)  Tulen Amanah   Mrz 93  Mrz 93 Lombok Timur  Nusa Tenggara Barat 
57  PT (Ltd.)  Patuh Beramal  Feb 94  Feb 94 Mataram  Nusa Tenggara Barat 
58  PT (Ltd.)  Kafalatuh Ummah  Jun 94  Jul 94 Deli Serdang  Sumatera Utara 
59  PT (Ltd.)  Al Washliyah  Sep 94  Nov 94 Deli Serdang  Sumatera Utara 
60  PT (Ltd.)  Gebu Prima  Feb 96  Mrz 96 Medan Sumatera  Utara 
61  PT (Ltd.)  Puduarta Insani  Apr 96  Jun 96 Deli Serdang  Sumatera Utara 
62  PT (Ltd.)  Mentari Pasaman Saiyo  Mai 96  Jul 96  Pasaman  Sumatera Barat 
63  PT (Ltd.)  Carana Kiat Andalas  Mai 97  Jun 97 Agam Sumatera  Barat 
64  PT (Ltd.)  Ampek Angkek Candung  Mai 99  Jul 99 Agam Sumatera  Barat 
65  PT (Ltd.)  Al Falah  Dez 94  Jan 95 Musi Banyuasin  Sumatera Selatan 
66  PT (Ltd.)  Hasanah  Jan 95  Apr 95 Bengkalis Riau 
67  PT (Ltd.)  Berkah Dana Fadhilah  Jun 96  Jun 96 Kampar Riau 
68  PT (Ltd.)  Amanah Bangsa  Jul 94  Sep 94 Simalungun Sumatera  Utara 
69  PT (Ltd.)  Sabiilul Muttaqiin  Okt 96  Jan 97 Banyumas Jawa  Tengah 
70  PT (Ltd.)  Ikhsanul Amal  Aug 95  Aug 95 Kebumen Jawa  Tengah 
71  PT (Ltd.)  Asad Alif  Aug 98  Sep 98 Kendal   Jawa Tengah 
72  PT (Ltd.)  Bakti Makmur Indah  Feb 94  Apr 94 Sidoarjo Jawa  Timur 
73  PT (Ltd.)  Amanah Sejahtera  Dez 95  Jan 96 Gresik Jawa  Timur 
74  PT (Ltd.)  Al Wadi'ah  Sep 94  Dez 94 Tasikmalaya Jawa  Barat 
75  PT (Ltd.)  Ikhwanul Ummah  Apr 93  Apr 93 Ujung Pandang  Sulawesi Selatan 
76  PT (Ltd.)  Matahari Ufuk Timur  Jun 94  Jun 94 Maros Sulawesi  Selatan 
77  PT (Ltd.)  Sinar Surya Sejati Palleko  Jul 94  Aug 94 Takalar Sulawesi  Selatan 
78  PT (Ltd.)  Niaga Madani  Okt 94  Dez 94 Pinrang Sulawesi  Selatan 
79  PT (Ltd.)  Nurul Ikhwan  Jun 95  Jun 95 Polewah Mamasa  Sulawesi Selatan 
80  PT (Ltd.)  Gowata  Sep 97  Dez 97 Gowa Sulawesi  Selatan 
81  PT (Ltd.)  Margirizki Bahagia  Nov 93  Jan 94 Bantul Yogyakarta 
82  PT (Ltd.)  Bangun Drajat Warga  Nov 93  Feb 94 Bantul Yogyakarta 
83  PT (Ltd.)  Ittihad  Apr 02  Jun 02 Wajo Sulawesi  Selatan 
84  PT (Ltd.)  Bumi Rinjani Batu  Nov 02  Jan 03 Batu Jawa  Timur 
85  PT (Ltd.)  Bumi Rinjani Malang  Nov 02  Jan 03 Malang Jawa  Timur 
86  PT (Ltd.)  Cilegon Mandiri  Apr 03  Mai 03 Cilegon Banten 
87  PT (Ltd.)  Buana Mitra Perwira  Jun 04  Jun 04 Purbalingga Jawa  Tengah 
88  PD (Local 
Govt. Co.) 
Tanggamus Mai  04  Jun 04 Tanggamus Lampung 
89  PT (Ltd.)  Artha Surya Barokah  Jun 04   Semarang Jawa  Tengah 
90  PT (Ltd.)  Situbondo  Mrz 04   Situbondo Jawa  Timur 
 
 
 48Appendix 1:  Financial infrastructure  
 
Indonesia has one of the most differentiated banking and microfinance sectors of any 
developing country. After more than a hundred years of evolutionary growth, the banking 
sector as of 2003 comprised: 
 
  138 commercial banks 
  with a total of 7,730 bank offices if 4,049 BRI rural units are excluded and 11,779 if 
they are included 
  2,134 rural banks (BPR), comprising rural and peri-urban banks 
 
The rural and microfinance sector comprises (Table 1)
1: 
  6,300 formal microfinance units 
  47,200 semiformal microfinance units 
  Together, these 53,500 units hold  47 million deposit and 32 million loan accounts  
  800,000 channeling groups 
  millions of rotating savings and credit associations (ROSCAs, arisan) of indigenous 
origin. 
 
 After the establishment of the first rural bank in 1895, a three-tiered financial system 
developed rapidly, comprising national, district and village institutions. At the top has been a 
century-old agricultural bank, now known as Bank Rakyat Indonesia (BRI). At the community 
level were two types of village banks, specialized on banking-in-kind and banking-in-money. 
As early as  1910, there were over 13,000 rural banks, comprising 12,542 rice banks 
(Lumbung Desa) and 585 money banks (Bank Desa). Since then, money has gradually 
replaced kind: as of 1940, their numbers had changed to 5,451 Lumbung Desa and 7,443 
Bank Desa. As of 1989 there were 2,056 Lumbung Desa and 3,297 Bank Desa, lumped 
together after 1989.
2 According to a recent ADB study
3, the microfinance sector now 
comprises some 6,000 formal and 48,000 semiformal microfinance institutional outlets 
(MFIs), serving about 45 million depositors
4 and around 32 million borrowers. (Table 1)
5 
Among them, the BRI Units (formerly unit desa) - presumably the developing world’s most 
successful rural microfinance providers - account for 74% of microsavings and 39% of 
microloans. Outside the formal and semiformal institutional sector are some 800,000 
channeling groups and the ubiquitous rotating savings association (arisan), numbering in the 
millions, as grassroots institutions of most of the poor and non-poor. New efforts have been 
made to extend the protection of the law to financial institutions of the poor and near-poor by 
preparing in 2001 a draft law for MFIs (Lembaga Keuangan Mikro, LKM).
6 Despite the 
extraordinarily high level of institutional differentiation, large numbers of households are 
reported to remain without access to formal and semiformal finance.  
 
                                                  
1 These institutions are predominantly rural and peri-urban. The figures differ widely according to source. Eg, 
Holloh (2001:33) lists a total of 93,700 outlets. A number of institutions with outreach into rural microfinance are 
not included here, among them private national and regional commercial banks and regional government-owned 
development banks (BPD). 
2 D. Steinwand, The Alchemy of Microfinance. Berlin: FWF 2001:172; D. Holloh, Microfinance 
Institutions Study. Jakarta: MoF, BI, GTZ 2001; H. D. Seibel, Finance with the Poor, by the Poor, for 
the Poor: Financial Technologies for the Informal Sector, With Case Studies from Indonesia. Social 
Strategies vol. 3, no. 2 (Dec. 1989: 3-47. 
3 ADB Rural Microfinance Indonesia (TA No. 3810-INO), March 2003, Annex 4 
4 Recorded here is the number of deposit accounts, the number of actual depositors is lower. 
5 These institutions are predominantly rural and peri-urban. The figures may differ widely according to 
source. Eg, Holloh (2001:33) lists a total of 93,700 outlets. A number of institutions with a partial 
outreach into rural microfinance are not included here, among them private national and regional 
commercial banks and regional government-owned development banks (BPD). 
6 Act XXX of 2001, draft dated 14/9/2001. This is a participatory effort coordinated by a Tim Inisiatif, 
first headed by Bank Indonesia and now by a newly created microfinance unit in the MoA. World Bank, 
ADB and GTZ are involved.  
  49Table 1: Number and outreach of formal and semiformal MFIs (BRI, BPR and BKD Dec. 
2003, others ~2000) (amounts in billion Rupiah) 




Loan accounts  Loans outstanding 
     In '000  %  Rp bn  %  In  '000  %  Rp bn  %  Av. loan Rp 
Banks                   
BRI Microbanking Div.  4,049  29,859  64  27,420  80  3,100  10  14,183  54  4,575,000 
Rural banks BPR ~2000 















40,527 11,043  24  1,659  5  11,093  34  4,787  18  431,500 
Unit Simpan Pinjam 
(USP) **** 
35,218 10,141  23  1,157  4  10,141  31  3,629  18  358 















Credit Unions (CU)  1,071  296  Nil  249  1  296  1  272  1  920 
BMT 2,938    Nil  46  Nil  73  0  51  0  701 
Swamitra/BUKOPIN 177  55  Nil  56  Nil  32  0  127  1  3,960 
Non-bank financial institutions                   
  Village MFIs 
(BKD)  
4,482 535  1  24  0  414 1 193 1 466,000 
  Other MFIs 
(LDKP) 
1,428 834  2 218  1  419 1 328 1 783,000 
Pawnshops  772 0  0 0  0  15,692  48  1,355  5  86,000 
Total all institutions*  53,471  46,969  101  34,387  101  32,463  99  26,474  100  815,500 
* Errors in percentage totals due to rounding. 
** Figures on BPR on the BI website differ by ~2%. 
*** The term units is not uniformly applied. Eg, in the case of the BRI Microbanking Division, it refers to 
outlets including cash offices of the unit desa (now: unit unit); in the case of BPR it refers to banks and 
excludes their branches.  
**** USP & KSP together as of 2003: 40,639 
Sources: BI 2003; BI BPR reporting; BRI Microbanking Division Monthly Report; ADB Rural 
Microfinance Indonesia (TA No. 3810-INO), Draft report March 2003, Annex 4, p. 2.  
 
The banking law in Indonesia recognized two types of banks: commercial banks (Bank 
Umum, BU, lit.: universal banks) and rural banks (Bank Perkreditan Rakyat, BPR, lit.: 
people’s credit banks).  
 
The commercial banking sector, which nearly collapsed during the 1997/98 crisis, has 
greatly recovered due to major consolidation efforts of the government, including numerous 
bank closures and mergers. From 1999 to 2003,  the gross non-performing loan ratio (NPL) 
went down from 32.8% to 8.1% and net NPL from 7.3% to 1.8%. During the same period, the 
banks went from losses (Rp 75.4tr, or 7.5% of total assets as of December 1999) to (pre-tax) 
profits of Rp 23.7tr, or 2.1% of total assets as of November 2003; similarly capital adequacy 
(CAR) went from –8.1% in 1999 to 20.7% in 2003. However, overall growth of the 
commercial banking sector was sluggish: From December 2000 to November 2003, total 
assets grew  in nominal terms by 10.8% from Rp 1,030.5tr to Rp 1,142.2tr; third-party funds 
(including savings and deposits) by 25.2% from Rp. 699,1tr to Rp 875.4tr; and credit by 
48.5% from Rp 320.4tr to Rp 475.7tr . 
 
Rural banks (BPR) according to the law of 1988 (PAKTO27) consist of  newly established 
BPR (BPR baru) and pre-existing rural banks converted into BPR (BPR lama). In the context 
of financial liberalization, the law was enacted in an effort to rationalize the highly complex 
rural finance sector, with the objective of bringing existing institutions under the umbrella of 
prudential regulation and supervision, providing a framework for the establishment of new 
financial institutions with private capital, and extending the outreach of financial institutions to 
  50the poorer sections of the rural and peri-urban population, thereby lessening their 
dependence on private moneylenders. Minimum capital requirements for BPR were  
uniformly set at Rp 50m, equivalent to US$ 29,000 in 1988, $24,000 in 1992 and $21,000 in 
1996. Most of the newly established BPR were set up by private owners. 
 
There are now (Dec.2003) 2134 licensed and regulated BPR. While they account for a mere 
1.0% of total banking assets their growth during the last three years as been far more rapidly 
than that the commercial banking sector (see below). 
 
Table 1.2: Basic data on rural banks (BPR), 2000-2003 (amounts in trillion Rupiah) 










2000  2,419  4.99 3.78 1.20 1.89 3.09 1.09 
2001  2,355  6.75 5.04 1.59 2.71 4.30 1.49 
2002  2141 9.34 6.86 2.02 4.12 6.14 1.91 
2003  2134  12.90  9.18 2.64 6.25 8.89 2.41 
Source: http://www.bi.go.id/bank_indonesia_english/main/statistics/. Figures may differ from BI written 
reports, which reflect various stages of updating.  
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Dec'93 Dec'94 Dec'95 Dec'96 Dec'97 Mar'98 June'98 Sept'98 Dec'98 Dec'99 Dec'00 Dec'01 Dec'02 Dec'03
   1. Number of banks
Total RBs 1709 1873 1948 1987 2140 2186 2227 2262 2262 2427 2419 2355 2141 2134
IRBs 22 46 57 71 75 77 77 78 78 79 80 81 83 84
Share IRBs to Total 1.3 2.5 2.9 3.6 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.4 3.4 3.3 3.3 3.4 3.9 3.9
   2.Loans (Million Rp)
Total RBs 1195868 1476001 1790193 2036205 2172515 2090393 1965230 1875365 1860595 2451593 3618927 5040000 6860000 9180000
IRBs 7380 19952 28737 39008 43330 51780 50500 51246 53502 57306 82326 110026 119206 138561
Share IRBs to Total 0.6 1.4 1.6 1.9 2.0 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.9 2.3 2.3 2.2 1.7 1.5
   3. Deposits (Million Rp)
Total RBs 993264 1207102 1385072 1554250 1576369 1587413 1513163 1489786 1470112 2038132 3081718 4300000 6140000 8890000
IRBs 6118 17654 24226 32513 33160 36061 32905 33683 35550 44067 62512 91417 97512 109999
Share IRBs to Total 0.6 1.5 1.7 2.1 2.1 2.3 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.2 2.0 2.1 1.6 1.2
   4. Total assets (Million Rp)
Total RBs 1566097 1900225 2253478 2574164 2735708 2745066 2696384 2688719 2751415 3462031 4731240 6750000 9340000 12900000
IRBs 11778 30369 43024 50571 60135 73027 70858 73627 80579 86783 113096 153321 165046 191750
Share IRBs to Total 0.8 1.6 1.9 2.0 2.2 2.7 2.6 2.7 2.9 2.5 2.4 2.3 1.8 1.5
* Number of BPRS by Dec. 2001: 4; Dec. 2002: 9 
Note: Double-click on table to show column Dec’03 on screen 
 
 
Appendix 2 Table 2: Development of Islamic Rural Banks, 1993-2003 Million IDR
Dec'93 Dec'94 Dec'95 Dec'96 Dec'97 Dec'98 Dec'99 Dec'00 Dec'01 Dec'02 Dec'03
Financing 7380 19952 28737 39008 43330 53502 57306 82326 110026 119206 138561
Deposits 6118 17654 24226 32513 33160 35550 44067 62512 91417 97512 109999
Total Assets 11778 30369 43024 50571 60135 80579 86783 113096 153321 165046 191750
N u m b e r  o f  B a n k s 2 24 65 77 17 57 87 98 08 18 38 4
Source: Islamic Banking Directorate-Bank Indonesia
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Table 1:  Total assets of commercial and rural banks by conventional and Islamic 
banking type, 2003 (in trillion Rupiah) 
Banking sector  Conventional  Islamic  Total 
  Amount Percent Amount Percent Amount Percent 
Commercial (BU)  1,060.5  98.8 7.86 97.6  1,068.4  98.8 
Rural  (BPR)  12.7 1.2 0.19 2.4 12.9 1.2 
Total banking sector  1,073.2 100.0  8.05  100.0 1,081.3 100.0 
 
Table 2:   Basic data of the commercial banking sector and Sharia-based commercial 
banks, Dec. 2003 (amounts in trillion Rupiah) 
Islamic commercial banks  Selected consolidated 





Total assets  1068.4  7.86  0.74 
Deposits 888.6  5.72  0.64 
Loans/financing 
outstanding 
477.2 5.53  1.16 




LDR, FDR*   53.7%  96.6 % 
Non-performing loans   8.2%  2.3 % 
Source: BI 1/2004:13 
* Loans-to-deposit ratio, financing-to-deposit-ratio 
 
Table 3:   Capital adequacy ratios and returns on assets in Islamic banks, 2000-2003 
 2000  2001  2002  Nov. 
2003 
CAR of Islamic commercial banks  53.4  30.8  21.5  20.3 
CAR of Islamic commercial banking units  23.7  19.9  36.5  32.8 
ROA   1.2  0.8  0.6 
Source: BI 2003:128 
 
Table 4: Deposits and loans by Islamic commercial banks and banking units, Dec. 2003 
Deposits 
Wadiah current accounts  11.1%
Mudarabah savings accounts  28.1%
Mudarabah time deposits  60.7%
Total percent  99.9%
Total amount  Rp 5.72tr
Percent of total liabilities and equity  72.8%
 
Table 5: Financings by Islamic commercial banks and banking units, Dec. 2003 
Financings 
Musharaka financings  5.5%
Mudarabah financings  14.4%
Murabahah receivables  71.5%
Istishna’ receivables  5.4%
Other 3.2%
Total percent  100%
Total amount  Rp. 5.53tr
Percent of total assets  70.4%
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Table 1:  Regional distribution of BPRS, June 2004 





 West  Java
 Banten 
 Central  Java
 D.I.  Yogykarta











  Nangroe Aceh Dar.
 North  Sumatra
 West  Sumatra




















 East  Kalimantan





Bali: 1  1.2   
West Nusa Tenggara:  2  2.3   
Papua: 1  1.2   
Total licensed BPRS  86  100.0   
Revoked licenses 
Total BPRS  




Table 2:  Year of origin, ownership and number of board members in 5 sample BPRS 
BPRS  Year of origin  No. of owners Owners  No of board members
1 Alwadi’ah  1994  3  Private individuals  9 
2 Artha Fis.  1994  9  Private individuals  10 
3 Harum Hik.  1994  25  3 ind. + 22 employees  7 
4 Wakalumi  1990/1994  118  Private individuals  7 
5 Bangka  1995  3  2 foundations, local gvt.  8 
 
 
Table 3:  Number of delivery units, number of staff and service radius in five sample BPRS 
Loan officers  BPRS  Number of units 
(incl. head-office) 
Number of staff 
Number  % of staff 
Service radius 
in km 
1  Alwadi’ah 2  18  12   30 
2 Artha Fis.  1  11  6    20 
3 Harum Hik.  5  22  12    50 
4 Wakalumi  5  38  13    40 
5 Bangka  2  18  9    50 
Average 
(mean) 
3 21.4  10.4  48.6  38 
 
  54Table 4:  Number of borrowers in four sample BPRS 
BPRS  Total no. of borrowers 
1 Alwadi’ah  800 
2 Artha Fis.  163 
3 Harum Hik.  800 
4 Wakalumi  2000 
5 Bangka  664 
Average (mean)  885 
 
 
Table 5:  Number of clients by occupation, sex and poverty category in four sample BPRS 
BPRS Total  no. 
of clients 










1 Alwadi’ah  4000 89  3  8  30  20 
2 Artha Fis.  1150  90  1 9 0  0 
3 Harum Hik.  6000 63  9  23  45  3 
4 Wakalumi  5000 95  0  5  *  0 
5 Bangka  1722 59  2  39  35  3 
Unweighted mean  3574 79  3  17  28  5 
* Both husband and wife have to sign the loan contract. 
 
 
Table 6:  Total assets of five sample BPRS 
BPRS  Total assets in mn
1 Alwadi’ah  6,951 
2 Artha Fis.  1,404 
3 Harum Hik.  6,887 
4 Wakalumi  12,554 
5 Bangka  7,689 
Average (mean)  7,097 
Mean of 84 BPRS  2,283 
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Source of funds  Amount in Rp million  Percent 
Current accounts  1,690.9  0.9 
Deposits 
 Savings






 Bank  Indonesia






 Subordinated  loans





Other liabilities  6,753.9  3.5 
Equity: 
 Paid-up  capital
 Other  capital
 Reserves
  Profit of previous year








Total liabilities and equity  191.750.2*  100.0 
*Error due to rounding 
 
 
Table 8:   Deposits of BPRS and BPR in percent of total assets and loans outstanding, 
Dec. 2003 
 BPRS  Conventional 
BPR 
BPR 
Average deposits in Rp bn  4.17 4.28 4.17 
Deposits in % of total assets  57.4  69.1  68.9 
Deposits in % of loans outstanding  79.4  97.1  96.8 
 
 
Table 9:   Savings and time deposits in the BPRS sector and in five sample BPRS, Dec. 
2003 
BPRS  Total deposits in mn  % savings  % time deposits 
1 Alwadi’ah  4,109.0  59.2  40.8 
2 Artha Fis.  619.2  75.8  24.2 
3 Harum Hik.  4,017.7  34.9  65.1 
4 Wakalumi  6,039.9  43.0  57.0 
5 Bangka  5,621.5  35.6  64.4 
Mean of 84 BPRS  109,998.9  53.2  46.8 
 
 
Table 10:  Deposit products in five sample BPRS 
BPRS Total  amount 
(in million Rp) 
Number of 
products 
Savings accounts*  Time deposits* 










 in % p.a. 
1 Alwadi’ah  3,796  4  50:50  6%  70:30  10% 
2 Artha Fis.  619  4  30:70  12%  40:60  18% 
3 Harum Hik.  4,018  3  40:60  8.8%  65:35  14% 




5 Bangka  5,622  n.a.  40:60 7.5% 55:45 11.5% 
Mean 4,019  5.75  40:60  8.3%  60:50  13% 
*By comprison, BMI, an Islamic commercial bank,  reports yields to depositors of 6-7% p.a. on savings 
accounts and 7-9% on term deposits. 
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Table 11:    Loan products in five sample BPRS
7 
Loan products in % of portfolio  BPRS Amount 




products  Murabahah Musyarakah Mudarabah  Other 
           
1 Alwadi’ah  5,694.4  800  3  60  40     
2 Artha Fis.  1,208.0  163  4  85      15 
3 Harum Hik.  4,312.7  800  1  100       
4 Wakalumi  9,652.8  2000  4  93  5  0.5  1 
5 Bangka  4,562.8  n.a.  2  90    10   
Unweighted mean  5,086.1  941  2,8 86  9  2 3 
 
The five sample BPRS have on average Rp 5.1bn in financings or loans outstanding, with  an average 
of Rp 5.4mn per borrower. They have from one to four loan products. The main product found in every 
bank is Murabahah, ie, a sales contract between bank and customer with a mutually agreed-upon 
fixed profit margin for the bank; this accounts for 86% of the unweighted average loan volume. Three 
of the banks have a Mudarabah or a Musyarakah product, with profit-sharing between the bank and 
one or several business partners, respectively, accounting together for 11 % of financings. Other 
products are of no or minor significance: BPRS Alwadi’ah lists Qard al-Hasanah for the very poor 
among its products, where the bank bears the full risk but receives no remuneration, but has in fact no 
borrowers.
8  BPRS Artha Fisabilillah includes consumer lending to salary earners among its products 
with a 15% share, which does not fall under the classical Islamic financing products; it also offers 
Musyarakah and Mudarabah financing, but its customers have not yet accepted this product. BPRS 
Wakalumi has a small Al-Ijarah or leasing portfolio. 
Murabahah, based on the principle of a sales contract with a fixed profit margin for the bank, is the 
main financing product, with a share of 90-100% in three of the five banks and an overall unweighted 
share of 86%. With its fixed mark-up (similar to an interest rate), it is better understood by the 
borrowers and easier to handle by the bank. The mark-ups are generally flat rates, which is common 
in Indonesia: Customers pay a fixed and equal amount per month while repaying in monthly or weekly 
instalments. The effective mark-up per annum varies by instalment schedule and maturity; as a rule of 
thump, the effective interest rate p.a. is approximately twice the flat rate, assuming equal monthly 
instalments over a repayment period of one year. In addition, there is frequently an up-front 
administrative fee, mostly of 1%. Of the five sample BPRS, only BPRS Wakalumi charges a mark-up 
on the declining balance; the others charge flat rates. Effective annual mark-ups or profit margins 
of the five banks are approximately 55% p.a., ranging from a low of 38.5% by the largest to a high of 
66% by the smallest of the five banks, assuming average maturities of one year; as actual maturities 
vary from 6-36 months, effective rates can be substantially lower or higher, respectively.
9 There are no 
penalties for late payment in the five banks, which means that effective mark-ups or interest rates go 
down as payments are delayed.
10 By comparison, the interest rates of the BRI units are 2% flat per 
month or approximately 43% effective p.a. The interest rate is reduced to 1.5% flat per month or 33% 
effective p.a. for customers who pay on time. BPR generally have lower efficiencies and higher 
interest rates than BRI units.  
Musyarakah and Mudarabah financings tend to be larger in volume: either at the same mark-up as 
Murabahan as in BPRS Wakalumi, or at almost half the rate as in BPRS Alwadi’ah.  
Loan sizes start as low as Rp 0.5m, 1.0m and Rp 3m (US$ 60-360), respectively, and go up to Rp 
50m, 75, 100m or 150m, respectively.  Maturities among the five banks are from 1-36 months. 
Instalments are mostly monthly; but one bank offers daily instalments through a collector, while 
another one permits daily, weekly, monthly or quarterly instalments. All loans are collateralised. Two of 
                                                  
7 By comparison, financings of BMI, the oldest and largest Islamic commercial bank with a loan 
portfolio of Rp. 2.25tr, are distributed product-wise as follows: Murabahah 53.5%; Mudharabah 34.6% 
Musyarakah 1.6%, other 10.3%. 
8 BMI also reports the existence of this product; but the amount is insignificant. No mark-up or profit-
share is included; but beneficiaries pay an administrative fee of 1%. Maturies are 1-2 years. Quard 
loans are mainly given to employees, eg, to rent a house, for educational and social purposes. 
9 By comparison, BMI charges margins of 15.5% eff. p.a. for 1
st year; 0.5% are added for every 
additional year (up to 18.5% in the 7
th year, the longest period of financing) on Murabahah financings.  
10 By comparison, charges no penalties on late payments, but a so-called administrative fee (stated in 
terms of a nominal amount, approx. 1% of amount overdue per month) which cannot be claimed as 
income and is allocated to a social fund. 
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implemented through frequent visits by loan officers or collectors. 
 
 
Table 12:   Non-performing loans, return on average assets and return on year-end 
assets in five sample BPRS (in %), 2003 
BPRS NPL  ROAA  ROA  (yr-end) 
1 Alwadi’ah  n.a.  2.0  1.5 
2 Artha Fis.  4.5  2.3  2.4 
3 Harum Hik.  3.0  n.a.  5.7 
4 Wakalumi  11  3.35  2.1 
5 Bangka  0  5.0  3.2 
BRI units  2.5  5.7   
 
 
Table 5.13:   Balance sheet, income statement and performance ratios of  BPRS Artha  
Fisabilillah, 201-2003 
Amounts in Rp million 
  Balance sheet  2001 2002 2003 
 Activa:     
  Cash at hand 
Kas 
168 118 101 
 910  785  1,208 
 43  65  4 
 
Gross loans/facilities outstanding 
Pembiayaan yang diberikan kotor 
./. Loan loss reserve 
./. Penyisihan Penghapusan 
  = Net loans/facilities 
outstanding 
  = Pembiayaan yg diberikan bersih 
867 720  1,204 
  Net fixed assets 
Aktiva tetap setelah dikurangi 
21 19 14 
  Other net assets 
Aktiva lain-lain Bersih 
89 106 85 
 Total  assets 
Jumlah aktiva 
1,145 963 1,404 
  Passiva:    
  Savings and deposits of clients 
Simpanan 
619 549 619 
 Borrowings 
Pinjaman 
100 0 338 
 Other  liabilities 
Kewajiban lain-lain 
4 0  14 
 Total  liabilities 
Jumlah kewajiban 
723 549 971 
 Paid-up  capital 
Modal ditempatkan dan disetor penuh 
387 387 387 
  Profit of past and current years 
Laba tahun berjalan 
35 27 46 
 Total  equity 
Jumlah ekuitas 
422 414 433 
  Total liabilities and equity 
Jumlah kewajiban dan ekuitas 
1,145 963 1,404 
 
  Income statement  2001 2002  2003 
  Gross income from financial operations 
Pendapatan marjin, bagi hasil, provisi, komisi 
466 392  400 
  ./. Interest or profit-sharing expenses 
./. Beban marjin dan bagi hasil  
(116) (102)  (109) 
  = Net income from financial operations  350  290  291 
  58= Jumlah pendapatan marjin dan bagi hasil 
  + Other operational income 
+ Jumlah pendapatan operasional lainnya 
63 44  48 
 (385)  (314)  (305) 
      
 
./. Other operational expenses 
./. Jumlah beban operasional lainnya 
Personnel expenses in % 
Beban personalia di % 
Loan loss provision (included above) 
Penyusutan dan penyisihan (di dalam) 
137 45 14
  = Operational profit 
= Laba operasional 
29* 30  34 
  ./. Non-operational expenses  
./. Beban non-operasional  
(2) 0  (1) 
  = Profit (loss) 
= Jumlah laba (rugi) 
27* 30  33* 
* Error due to rounding  
       
Performance  2001  2002  2003 
Loan recovery   
NPL, NPF in %  9.6 19.8 4.5 
Loan Loss Ratio in %  8.9  18.7  6.25 
Profitability   
Return on average  assets in %  2.3  1.7  2.4 
Return on average equity in %  7.0  4.3  8.75 
Ratios   
Equity/liabilities in %  58.4  75.4  44.6 
Deposits/liabilities in %  85.6  100.0  63.7 
LDR Loan-to-deposit, FDR Financing-to-deposit ratio in %  147  143  195 
CAR Capital adequacy in %  38.7  43.9  31.6 
NPL, NPF Non-performing loans; Islamic: Non-performing finance 
Loan loss ratio = loans written off to average loans outstanding 
Capital adequacy = capital/net loans or net financing 
 
 
Table 14:   Balance sheet, income statement of BPRS Wakalumi, 2002 and 2003 
Amounts in Rs million 








Giro, tabungan, deposito pada bank 
1,170.8 1,886.4 
7,301.1 9,653.8 
(127.9) (180.8  ) 
Gross loans/facilities outstanding 
Pembiayaan yang diberikan kotor 
./. Loan loss reserve 
./. Penyisihan Penghapusan 
  = Net loans/facilities outstanding 
  = Pembiayaan yg diberikan bersih 
7,173.2 9,473.0 
Net fixed assets 
Aktiva tetap setelah dikurangi 
217.2 203.6 
Other net assets 





Savings and deposits of clients 
Simpanan 
5,038.1 6,039.9 
Deposits of banks 















Modal ditempatkan dan disetor penuh 
1,494.5 1,521.5 
Earnings (retained and current) 





Total liabilities and equity 




Income statement  Rs. Million 
Gross income from financial operations 
Pendapatan marjin, bagi hasil, provisi, komisi 
2,231.8 
./. Interest or profit-sharing expenses 
./. Beban marjin dan bagi hasil  
(861.4) 
= Net income from financial operations 
= Jumlah pendapatan marjin dan bagi hasil 
1,370.4 
+ Other operational income 




./. Other operational expenses 
./. Jumlah beban operasional lainnya 
  Personnel expenses in % 
  Beban personalia di % 
  Loan loss provision (included above) 
  Penyusutan dan penyisihan (di dalam) 
(126.9)
= Operational profit 
= Laba operasional 
374.4 
./. Non-operational expenses  
./. Beban non-operasional  
7.7 
= Gross profit (loss) 
= Jumlah laba (rugi) 
366.7 
./. Religious tax 
./. Zakat 
9.0 
./. Other expenses 
./. Beban pajak penghasilan 
89.8 
Net profit (loss) 
Laba bersih (rugi) 
267.9 
 
     
Performance  2001  2002  2003 
Loan recovery   
NPL, NPF in %      11 
Loans written off in million Rp   0   0   5m 
Loan Loss Ratio in %   0  0    3 
Profitability    
Return on average  assets in %   4.07   3.65   3.35 
Return on average equity in %   20.32  21.05    24.10 
Ratios  2001  2002  2003 
Equity/liabilities in %      26.6   21.7 
Deposits/liabilities in %      67.3   58.5 
LDR Loan-to-deposit, FDR Financing-to-deposit ratio in %  85.32  88.58  86.72 
CAR Capital adequacy in %   22.99  21.74   20.86  
OCR BOPO Operational costs-to-revenue  82.79  86.50  84.71 
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Table 1: Financial cooperatives as part of the microfinance sector* 
  Units  Deposit 
accounts in '000
Deposit volume  




in Rp bn 
Total  MFIs  53,471 46,969 34,387 32,463  26,474 
Rural banks (Dec. 2003)  2,134  5,535  8,868  1,993  8,985 
Financial  cooperatives  40,527  11,043 1,659 11,093  4,787 
Financial cooperatives in 
% of all MFIs 
75.8%  23.5% 4.8% 34.2%  18.1% 
Financial cooperatives in 
% of MFIs excl. BRI units 
82.0% 64.5% 23.8% 37.8%  38.9% 
* Adapted from App. 1 Table 1 
 
 
Table 2:   Basic data of KSP/USP, December 2002 and December 2003 
  KSP/USP sector 2002 KSP/USP sector 2003  Mean per KSP/USP 2003
Number of KSP/USP  36,532  36,376   
Number of members:  10,514,624  10,420,582  286 
Total assets  6,792.7 billion Rp  6,197.1 billion Rp  170.4 million Rp 
Loans outstanding  5,551.3 billion Rp  5,273.6 billion Rp  145.0 million Rp 
Deposits   1,500.8 billion Rp  1,593.4 billion Rp  43.8 million Rp 
Source: Ministry of Cooperatives, Perkembangan KSP/USP Koperasi Seluruh Indonesia, 2004   
 
 
Table 3:  Year of origin, members and number of board members in four BMT 
BMT  Year of origin 
and registration 
No. of members  No of board members
1 At-Taqwa  1994/2000  4000  14 
2 Ibaadurrahman  1992/1992  3000  3 
3 Latanza  1996/2000  800 in 80 SHGs 
20 SHGs active as borrowers 
60 saving groups only 
8 
4 Wira Mandiri  1997/1999  45 voting members;  




Table 4:   Regional distribution of BMT, 2001 and 2003* 
BMT 2001  BMT 2003  KSP/USP Province 
Number  Percent Number Percent Percent 
Java: 
 Jakarta 
  West Java + Banten
 Central  Java
 D.I.  Yogyakarta

















  Nangroe Aceh Dar.
 North  Sumatra
 West  Sumatra



























  61Sulawesi: 
 North  Sulawesi
 Central  Sulawesi
 Sulawesi  Tenggara



















 West  Kalimantan
 Central  Kalimantan
 East  Kalimantan












Bali:  15  0.5 15 0.5  2.7 
West Nusa Tenggara (NTB)  93  3.1  93  3.3  2.1 
East Nusa Tenggara (NTT)  8  0.3  8  0.3  1.7 
Maluku + Maluku Utara  21  0.7  21  0.7  1.2 
Papua:  18  0.6 19 0.7  1.2 
Total  number  3037   2856  40,639 
Total percent    100.1**    100.0  100% 
Change  2001-2003     -6.0%    
*Source: (a) BMT: PINBUK statistics for Dec. 2001, manually corrected for  Dec. 2003 
(b) KSUP/USP: Ministry of Cooperatives, Rekapitulasi Pemetaan KSP/USP, 13 Apr 2004 
** Error due to rounding 
 
 
Table 5:    Number of staff, loan officers and service radius in four BMT 
Loan officers  BMT Number  of 
staff  Number  % of staff 
Service radius in km 
1 At-Taqwa  10  5  50  20 
2 Ibaadurrahman  9  2 loan officers 
+ 4 collectors 
67 5 
3 Latansa  4  2  50  10 
4 Wira Mandiri  5  2  40  20 
Average (mean)  7  3.75  40  13,75 
 
 
Table 6:    Composition of clientele of  four BMT 
BMT Total  no. 
of clients 












1 At-Taqwa  4000 99  0  1  0  45  60 
2 Ibaadurrahman  2500 100  0  0  0  50  70 
3 Latansa  800  100  0  0  0  40  30 
4 Wira Mandiri  2000 85  5  10  0  30  20 
Average 2325 96  1  3  0  41  45 
 
 
Table 7:  Number of borrowers in 4 sample BMT 
BMT  Total no. of borrowers
1 At-Taqwa  500 
2 Ibaadurrahman  300 
3 Latansa  200 
4 Wira Mandiri  308 
Average 327 
 
  62Table 8:   BMT by asset category, 2001 
Asset category  Number  Percent 
> Rp 1 billion  63 2.1 
Rp 500 million – 1 billion  223  7.3 
Rp 250 – 500 million  1202  39.6 
Rp 50 – 250 million  1260  41.5 
Rp < 50 million  289  9.5 
Total 3037  100.0 
 
Table 9:     Selected balance sheet data of four BMT (in Rp million) 
BMT  Total assets   Gross loan portfolio Total deposits  FDR in % 
1 At-Taqwa  2,211.2  1,819.4  1,957.9  93 
2 Ibaadurrahman  341.4  217.2  199.3  109 
Latansa 501.1  345.8  137.15  252 
4 Wira Mandiri  806.4  587.3  575.8  102 
Average (mean)  965.0  742.4  717.5  103 
 
 
Table 10:    Deposit products in four BMT 
BMT Total  amount 
(in million Rp) 
Number of 
products 
Savings accounts  Time deposit accounts 










 in % p.a. 










Latanza 137.15  4  40:60  11  40:60  14-16% 
Wira Mandiri  575.8  5    10    14 
Mean 717.5  4.5  34:66  8.8  42:58  13.6 
 
 
Table 11:    Loan products in four BMT 
Loan products in % of portfolio  BMT Amount 




products  Murabahah Mudarabahh Qard  Al-Hassan Other 
At-Taqwa  1,819.4 500  4  70  15  6  10 
Ibaadurrahman 217.2  300  2  51  44  2  3 
Latanza 345.8  200  2  33  61  6   
Wira Mandiri  587.3  308  4  92  8    0 
Unweighted mean  742.4 327  3  61.5 32  3.5  3 
 
Murabahah financings start at amounts of Rp 100,000 in two sample BMTs and Rp 1mn in another 
two; maximum loan sizes range from 3 to 30 million in the four BMTs. Minimum loan periods range 
from 1-3 months, maximum loan periods range from 10 to 36 months. Instalments are usually monthly 
or weekly; BMT Wira Mandiri also allows for daily instalment collection. Mark-ups are negotiated 
between the BMT and the customer and thus variable, sometimes by a wide margin. Effective mark-
ups p.a., comprising a flat rate per  month and an up-front administrative fee, range from 
approximately 38% to 66%; they are mostly above 50% p.a.  
Mudarabahh financings in the four sample BMT start at loan sizes ranging from Rp 0.1m to 5m; 
maximum loan sizes range from Rp 5m to 25m. Minimum loan periods range from 1-12 months, 
maximum loan periods range from 10 to 24 months. Instalments, as in Murabahah, are usually 
monthly or weekly and also daily in BMT Wira Mandiri.  It appears that BMT, unlike BPRS, are unable 
to calculate variable profit-sharing margins; instead they charge mark-ups identical to those in 
Murabahah. An exception is BMT Latanza which charges the mark-up on a declining balance, but a 
higher administrative fee; the effective charge is approx. 35% p.a.  
  63Three of the four BMT offer Qard Al-Hassan at no remuneration to new microentrepreneurs; 
repayment is expected but not enforced. Loan sizes are small, mostly between Rp 100,000 or even 
50,000 and 1m. BMT At-Taqwa also offers a variant, Qard, where repayment is enforced and loan 
sizes are somewhat larger, Rp 0.5-2.0m. 
Three of the BMT charge no penalties in case of late payments; BMT Latanza negotiates penalties 
with the customer, arriving on average at an extra monthly charge of 2.5%.  
The terms and conditions of financings in BMT At-Taqwa, the largest of the four sample BMT, are 
presented below. The portfolio includes two unremunerated financing products for start-up 
microentrepreneurs: Qard, accounting for 10% of the portfolio where repayment is enforced and 
collateral seized if necessary; and Qard al Hassan, accounting for 5% of the portfolio, which is 
repayable but no action is taken in case of defaulting. There are compulsory savings of 5% in 
Murabahah, which have to be deposited up-front, and in Qard, where they are deposited at the time 
disbursement (yet not interpreted as “deducted”).  
 
Table 12:   Financing terms and conditions of BMT At-Taqwa 
L o a n  p r o d u c t s   
1: Murabaha  2: Mudarabahh  3: Qard Al-
Hassan 
4: Qard 
Portfolio 70%  15%  5%  10% 
Number of borrowers  80%  4%  6%  10% 
1 5 0.1  0.5  Minimum loan size in Rp million 
Maximum loan size in Rp million  25 25 1  2 
    
18-24% 18-24  0  0 
1.5% 1.5  0  0 
Profit-sharing margins: 
   Nominal (flat)  
   Fees if any 
   Effective p.a. (approx.)  38-50% 38-50% 0%  0% 
Profit-sharing vs. interest rates  A fair system 
Admin. fee  for late payment  0  0  0  0 
3 12  3 3  Minimum loan period in months 
Maximum loan period in months  36 24 12 12 
Instalment  schedule  M M M M 
Collateral/guarantee requirements  Yes  Yes  No  No 
Loan size tied to savings?  10%  No  5-10%  5-10% 
 
 
Table 13:  Non-performing loans and return on year-end assets in four BMT, 2003 (in %) 
BMT NPL  ROA  (yr-end) 
At-Taqwa 1.9 2.7 
Ibaadurrahman 10  1.45 
Latanza 1.4  1.7 
Wira Mandiri  30  0.16 
 
BMT At-Taqwa is the biggest and apparently best-performing BMT of the four sample cases, with a 
year-end ROA of 2.7% and a ROE (on paid-in capital) of 49%. Its balance sheet, income statement 
and performance ratios are given below. BMT Ibaadurrahman, with a ROA of 1.45,  reports a good 
performance since it moved to its new location near the local market; within one year, its total assets 
more than doubled from Rp 150m to 341m. The performance of BMT Latanza is satisfactory, but 
seems to be contingent upon donations and government soft loans.  
One poorly performing BMT was purposely included in the sample, namely BMT Wira Mandiri, which 
reports a break-even ROA of 0.16% for 2003, but is technically bankrupt. The manager reports 
massive delays and defaulting, which he attributes to a lack of knowledge and experience of 
management; high management turnover; weak controls by inexperienced supervisors; weak 
compliance with sharia; a lack of observance of prudential norms; and a conflict of interests in lending 
resulting in so-called buddy loans.  Eg, the portfolio includes an investment of Rp 40.4m in a dental 
clinic and a return of Rs 1.36m  or 3.4% during 2003, which is below the inflation rate. The NPL ratio is 
estimated at 30%. Rp 30m have to be written off. Provisioning is inadequate: Rp 4.15 in the balance 
sheet and Rp 1.5m in the income statement of 2003. The profit of Rp 1.26m in the balance sheet is 
thus grossly misleading. With a capital of Rp 26.8m and a volume of bad debts to be written off of Rp 
30m the BMT is technically bankrupt.  
 
  64Table 14:   Balance sheet, income statement and performance ratios  
of BMT At-Taqwa,  31 December 2003 (Amounts in Rp million) 
Balance sheet  2003 








Gross loans/facilities outstanding 
Pembiayaan yang diberikan kotor 
./. Loan loss reserve 
./. Penyisihan Penghapusan, PYD 
  = Net loans/facilities outstanding 
  = Pembiayaan yg diberikan 
bersih 
1,739.4 
Net fixed assets 
Harta  tetap setelah dikurangi 
49.4 
Other net assets 





Savings and deposits of clients 
Simpanan 
1,957.9 
Donations from social institutions 
Baitul Maal 
1.4 
















Laba tahun lalu  
0.0 
Profit of current year 





Total liabilities and equity 
Jumlah pasiva  
2,211.2 
 
Income statement  2003 
Income (Pendapatan)   
Income from financial operations 
Pendapatan marjin, bagi hasil, provisi, komisi 
509.4 
+ Other operational income 







./. Interest or profit-sharing expenses 
./. Beban marjin dan bagi hasil  
199.0 
  65262.8 
196.6
./. Other operational expenses 
./. Jumlah beban operasional lainnya 
  Personnel expenses: amount 
  Beban personalia:  
  Personnel expenses in % 
  Beban personalia di % 
74.8%
Loan loss provision (included above) 





Net profit (loss) 
Laba bersih (rugi) 
58.7 
  
Performance  2003 
Loan recovery 
NPL, NPF in %  1.9 
Loans written off in million Rp  0 
Loan Loss Ratio in %  0 
Profitability 
Return on year-end  assets in %  2.7 
Return on year-end earning assets in%  3.2 
Return on paid-in equity in %  48.9 
Ratios 
Equity/liabilities in %  5.9% 
Deposits/liabilities in %  96.7 
LDR Loan-to-deposit, FDR Financing-to-deposit ratio in % 
CAR Capital adequacy in %  6.9 
Efficiency 
Number of active borrowers/loan officer  100 
BOPO Operational costs-to-revenue  89.3 
Value of loans outstanding/loan officer in Rp million  363.8 
92.9 
 
 
  66